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There are many types of models for counterterrorism, explaining different 
problems that the military faces in the fight against terrorism. This thesis proposes that 
one of the fundamental assumptions underlying existing models of counterterrorism is 
that the struggle with terrorists can be understood as a war in the traditional sense of the 
term. We propose to rethink the struggle against terrorism as a fight against an infection. 
The epidemic of terrorist ideology within part of the world is a result, from this 
perspective, of the infectiousness of that ideology. Using the insights of the field of the 
epidemiology of ideas, this research looks into the models and methods used to 
understand and fight biological epidemics. We work with the SIR model from 
mathematical epidemiology, which partitions populations into susceptible, infected, and 
recovered categories, and apply that model with notional starting rates to the epidemic of 
terrorist ideology. This research allows another set of assumptions for models used in 
counterterrorism because the insights gained from viewing terrorism as a symptom of an 






I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my faculty advisor, Dr. Stephen 
Baumert, for his guidance and support throughout the course of this thesis effort. In 
addition, I thank my reader, Lt. Col. David Denhard for his part in my research. I thank 
my family and my friends for supporting me as I worked and helping me to clarify my 
goals and processes. Special thanks to Dustin Mixon for helping me with Mathematica. I 
thank my classmates and professors for the insights and experience I have had access to 
through the course of my time doing this research. 
  
 






This Note is not to be included with the Acknowledgments – it is for information only:  It is prohibited to include any personal 
information in the following categories about U.S. citizens, DOD Employees and military personnel: social security account 
numbers; home addresses; dates of birth; telephone numbers other than duty officers which are appropriately made available to 




Table of Contents 
Page 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv 
Acknowledgments................................................................................................................v 
Table of Contents............................................................................................................... vi 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... xi 
Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................1 
1.1 Background.............................................................................................................1 
1.2 Problem Statement and Approach..........................................................................6 
1.3 Scope of Research ................................................................................................13 
1.4 Thesis Outline.......................................................................................................14 
Chapter 2: Literature Review.............................................................................................16 
2.1 Approaches to the problem of terrorism...............................................................16 
2.2 Roots of terrorism.................................................................................................18 
2.3 Epidemiology of Ideas..........................................................................................23 
2.4 SIR models: Deterministic Modeling of Infectious Diseases...............................27 
2.5 Infectious Disease Eradication Strategies ............................................................29 
2.6 Summary...............................................................................................................31 
Chapter 3: Mathematical Models of Infectious Diseases ..................................................33 
3.1 The SIR Model: An Overview .............................................................................33 
3.2 Threshold Numbers: R0, σ, and R ........................................................................36 
3.3 The Epidemic SIR Model.....................................................................................37 
3.4 The Endemic SIR Model ......................................................................................45 
vi 
 
3.5 Adding age groups to the SIR model ...................................................................49 
3.6 Applying the partition principle to varying levels of influence ...........................62 
3.7 One step further: the effects of immunization on the model ................................63 
3.8 Applications of SIR models..................................................................................70 
3.9 Infectious Disease Eradication: Necessary Conditions and Strategies.................71 
3.9.1 Necessary Conditions for Eradication ......................................................... 71 
3.9.2 Eradication strategies ................................................................................... 72 
3.10 Summary.............................................................................................................74 
Chapter 4: Applying Epidemic Models and Strategies to Terrorism.................................75 
4.1 The epidemic SIR model of terrorism..................................................................75 
3.2 The endemic SIR model of terrorism ...................................................................80 
4.3 Two age category model ......................................................................................84 
4.4 Terrorism model partitioned by influence, including “immunity”.......................90 
4.5 Additional applications of a partitioned model ....................................................95 
4.6 Eradication strategies applied to the epidemic of terrorist ideology ....................96 
4.7 Summary...............................................................................................................97 
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................99 
5.1 Summary...............................................................................................................99 
5.2 Recommendations ..............................................................................................100 
5.2.1 Populating SIR models with demographic data......................................... 100 
5.2.2 Other epidemiological models ................................................................... 101 
5.2.3 Using other applications of epidemiology ................................................. 102 









List of Figures 
Page 
Figure 1: SIR model of measles epidemic ........................................................................ 28 
Figure 2: SIR model flow diagram ................................................................................... 33 
Figure 3: Phase plane portrait of epidemic SIR model ..................................................... 40 
Figure 4: Susceptible and infected population proportions over time .............................. 41 
Figure 5: Higher contact number SIR model phase plane ................................................ 42 
Figure 6: Higher contact number SIR model over time.................................................... 42 
Figure 7: Low contact number SIR model phase plane.................................................... 43 
Figure 8: Low contact number SIR model over time ....................................................... 44 
Figure 9: Endemic SIR model phase plane....................................................................... 47 
Figure 10: Endemic model over time................................................................................ 48 
Figure 11: Typical paths for an endemic phase plane....................................................... 49 
Figure 12: Age category model flow diagram .................................................................. 53 
Figure 13: Two age group SIR model phase plane........................................................... 56 
Figure 14: Two age group SIR model phase plane for category 1 only ........................... 57 
Figure 15: Two age group SIR model phase plane for category 2 only ........................... 57 
Figure 16:  Susceptible, infectious, and recovered fractions of age group model ............ 59 
Figure 17: Susceptible, infectious, and recovered fractions of category 1 ....................... 60 
Figure 18: Susceptible, infectious, and recovered fractions of category 2 ....................... 60 
Figure 19: Partition model flow diagram with immunization effects............................... 64 
Figure 20: Influence category SIR model with immunization phase plane...................... 67 
ix 
 
Figure 21: Influence category SIR model with immunization over time ......................... 67 
Figure 22: Highly influential individuals phase plane...................................................... 68 
Figure 23: Highly influential individuals over time ......................................................... 69 
Figure 24: Terrorism SIR epidemic phase plane—s(t) vs. i(t).......................................... 78 
Figure 25: Terrorism SIR epidemic model over time....................................................... 79 
Figure 26: Terrorism SIR endemic phase plane—s(t) vs. i(t)........................................... 82 
Figure 27: Terrorism SIR endemic model over time ........................................................ 83 
Figure 28: Two age category terrorism SIR model phase plane....................................... 86 
Figure 29: Two age category terrorism SIR model over time .......................................... 86 
Figure 30: Age category 1 phase plane............................................................................. 88 
Figure 31: Age category 1 over time ................................................................................ 88 
Figure 32: Age category 2 phase plane............................................................................. 89 
Figure 33: Age category 2 over time ................................................................................ 89 
Figure 34: Terrorism influence model with "immunity" phase plane .............................. 93 
Figure 35: Terrorism influence category model with "immunity" over time ................... 93 
x 
 
List of Tables 
Page 
Table 1: Expected times within categories M, E, and I .................................................... 35 
Table 2: SIR Model Notation............................................................................................ 38 
Table 3: Contact rates in the age category SIR model...................................................... 51 
Table 4: Meanings of β rates ............................................................................................ 52 
Table 5: Two age group SIR model initial values ............................................................ 55 
Table 6: Meanings of  α rates ........................................................................................... 65 
Table 7: Influence model with immunization initial values ............................................. 66 
Table 8: Factors contributing to eradication candidacy.................................................... 72 
Table 9: SIR Model Notation............................................................................................ 76 
Table 10: Notional rates for terrorist SIR model .............................................................. 77 
Table 11: Notional rates for endemic terrorism model..................................................... 80 
Table 12: Age category rates for terrorism SIR model..................................................... 85 





An Epidemiological Approach to Terrorism 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
The problem of terrorism and how to best fight it has become a central question 
for the American military. There are large numbers of papers and books that examine the 
sources of terrorism and how things have gotten to the point that they have with the 
Global War on Terror. Every group of researchers takes their particular slant to 
considering how best to approach this fight, and they have developed a lot of specific 
systems and models, all with the intent to somehow help along the fight that the United 
States is engaged in against transnational terrorist groups. 
Within the operational research arena, many models exist that purport to allocate 
resources, develop strategies, and otherwise solve problems that plague the war on terror. 
These models engage diverse problem-solving approaches, from linear programming to 
simulations, but all of them seem to rely on certain fundamental presuppositions about 
the nature of the fight against terrorism. Even the terminology of the title of the struggle, 
the Global War on Terror, highlights the underpinning assumption that the United States 
is engaged in a struggle with terrorists that can be understood as a war. 
War is defined as “a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict 
between states or nations . . . the art or science of warfare . . . a state of hostility, conflict, 
or antagonism . . . [or] a struggle or competition between opposing forces or for a 
particular end” by the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (http://www.m-
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w.com/dictionary/war). The United States military has evolved many different strategies 
and doctrines that allow it to fight in wars—these have changed over time, related often 
to the particular conflicts that the American military has been involved in. One of the 
most strongly influential military philosophers who has influenced Western definitions of 
war was Carl von Clausewitz. His theory has been invoked, especially since the Vietnam 
War, as the call to principled, decisive, and rational action in warfare. (Fleming, 2004: 
62-63)  
Following the philosophical trail blazed by Clausewitz, much of Western thought 
has centered around the idea that within conflicts, rational objectives are desired on both 
sides and rational actions stem from those objectives. Because of this, many models of 
conflict have been created that include game theory and its assumptions of rational action 
on the part of both “players” in a conflict. However, reason is a hallmark of Western 
thought, and not something that is universally admired or sought after in other cultures. 
The fundamentalist Muslim would likely see studied rational self-preserving action, in 
warfare, as being something intrinsically antithetical to his or her values.  
Western thought about war and the optimal strategies in which to fight war tend to 
concentrate on optimizing the effects of one side’s weapons strikes on the other side. To 
this end, much inquiry has been made into centers of gravity, the idea that one can 
maximize the harm to the other side by choosing one’s targets for their strategic and 
economic value to the other side in the conflict. The assumption is that, once one side 
experiences enough loss of manpower and infrastructure, that side will have no other 
option but to surrender and end the conflict. This underlying assumption also contributes 
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to models of rational decision-making in game theory. However, these assumptions that 
people operate in a purely rational manner is fundamentally Western in nature. The 
actions of terrorists and other such “fanatics” tend to defy rational explanation—in no 
game-theoretic model would the behavior of a suicide bomber maximize the expected 
payoff for that bomber.  
In the article “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology”, author Lee Harris describes the 
tendency of Americans to see the struggle against terrorists as a traditional war as 
follows: 
“This common identification of 9-11 as an act of war arises from a deeper 
unquestioned assumption. . . . The assumption is this: An act of violence on the 
magnitude of 9-11 can only have been intended to further some kind of political 
objective. What this political objective might be, or whether it is worthwhile—
these are all secondary considerations; but surely people do not commit such acts 
unless they are trying to achieve some kind of recognizably political purpose. 
“Behind this shared assumption stands the figure of Clausewitz and his 
famous definition of war as politics carried out by other means. The whole point 
of war, on this reading, is to get other people to do what we want them to do: It is 
an effort to make others adopt our policies and/or to further our interests. 
Clausewitzian war, in short, is rational and instrumental. It is the attempt to bring 
about a new state of affairs through the artful combination of violence and the 
promise to cease violence if certain political objectives are met.” (Harris, 2002: 2) 
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The military understanding of the word “war” carries with it expectations of a 
defined struggle with opponents who have a clear objective—to do harm to us. We 
approach our problem solving, then, with the expectation that our opponents, the 
terrorists, have the Clausewitzian goal of maximizing the damage that they can do to 
American interests both overseas and here in the homeland. The problem with this 
assumption—which is evident in most of the models of counterterrorist applications—is 
that it has not been supported by the actions of terrorists. Terrorists and their greater 
transnational networks have not behaved in a manner that one could predict with a 
Clausewitzian understanding of the nature of the opponent. 
Recent analyses of terrorist actions, particularly the troublesome transnational 
Islamist terrorist groups, have highlighted this fact. Even though they have the resources 
to strike us, and the clear example of ways to maximize panic and chaos through the 
American public, these groups have not chosen to do so. As much time and resources 
have been put into the problem of divesting terrorist groups of training facilities, recruits, 
weapons and monetary resources, it has been a difficult problem to cut these resources 
off entirely. Some groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah have turned to South American 
drug trafficking in order to fund their groups, and other transnational terrorist groups 
have likely done the same. Countries such as North Korea and China, traditionally 
antagonistic to the Western world and the United States in particular, have shown no 
compunction about trading in weapons with this area of the world, leading to an 
understanding that the groups who want these resources have the ability to obtain them. 
Thus it would be foolish to underestimate the resources at the hands of the terrorist 
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groups—but one would expect, if these groups were seeking to maximize damage and 
chaos, that they would have leveraged these resources against the United States in a way 
that we have not seen since 2001. 
 Additionally, terrorists who have paid attention the current events and the 
American media would have had ample proof for what would sow the seeds of chaos and 
panic through the United States. The anthrax scare after September 11th, 2001 and its 
resulting disruption of the country’s mail could easily have been continued and leveraged 
to create even more panic and discord. The media has fed national audiences with scenes 
of biological, chemical, and nuclear threats, and any terrorist keeping track of made-for-
TV movies since the attacks in New York and Washington DC would have an idea how 
to disrupt the American public. Because terrorist groups have not acted in such a way as 
to maximize terror and chaos in the American public and among Americans overseas, it 
does not make sense to base models on the assumption that they are doing so. 
In order to reassess our assumptions about the goals of our opponents in the war 
on terror, we need to first understand our opponents. Next we need to look at their actions 
and the forces at work in their environment so that we can understand better how to fight 
them. For the purposes of this paper, we will consider transnational Islamist terrorist 
groups, largely centered in the Middle East. 
If the terrorist attacks were not motivated politically or in a utilitarian way, and 
we of the Western world—particularly within the United States—are not going to have a 
good grasp of the cultural factors going on to create ripe conditions for terrorist groups, 
how are we to fight against attacks made on our people? We cannot fight the last war—in 
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this case the Cold War, a war of ideologies—because it’s familiar. While we might fight 
with those means and methods, we are going to continue to chase down a shadow 
opponent and become bogged down in unpopular nation-building and guerilla warfare as 
we have already within the nations of Afghanistan and Iraq. It is evident that something 
in our presuppositions needs to change, in order that we will be able to meet this conflict 
head-on. Then what is the problem we are looking for, and what is a good solution for 
that problem? 
 
1.2 Problem Statement and Approach 
 
With an understanding of the roots of terrorism as a background for our 
understanding of the Global War on Terror, it becomes evident that the forces at work in 
the world that have caused our current state of war are extremely complex and entangled. 
The actions that terrorists take continue to baffle us because we keep expecting them to 
behave in a Western way, to seek to maximize the damage that they can do to us and to 
sow chaos and panic among Americans both at home and abroad. If the war on terror is a 
war in the classical Western sense, then it is not a war that transnational Islamist terrorist 
groups are fighting against us. 
With this in mind, then, we need to readdress the assumptions upon which we are 
basing our research into systems, strategies, and problem solving for the war on terror. 
While we may still need to treat this as a struggle where we seek the greatest disruption 
of their networks for the least cost on our part, we know that their goals are not similarly 
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expressed and realized. Terrorism is not so much the tactic of a great army that seeks to 
bring down the Western world, even if that might be part of the side effects of their 
greater struggles. Instead, terrorism—particularly that directed at Western peoples—is a 
symptom of greater cultural currents of change. Islamist terrorism, then, could be classed 
as a cultural malaise, a sickness that comes about as a result of the environment 
surrounding people who are in the midst of great transition. Instead of having a valid 
cultural model for building a solid civilization for the future, people in the Middle East 
are falling prey to an infectious worldview that sees the Western world as being to blame 
for the problems of the Middle East in particular, and seeks to do harm to the Western 
world in large symbolic gestures such as the attacks in New York and Washington DC. 
Then it becomes apparent that the most useful framework from which to consider 
terrorism is not that of a war against an organized opponent, but instead as a struggle to 
eradicate a disease. To see terrorism, and the mindset that propagates terrorism, as an 
epidemic would mean that we would have to reassess all of our strategies and many of 
our models as we work to solve problems and end the Global War on Terror. Our need to 
develop strategies to fight the war on terror would be better served to see the ideology of 
terrorists as a virulent disease that is spreading through susceptible areas as an epidemic. 
Within the business world, particularly in the study of marketing, the notion of 
ideas as being infectious agents has become increasingly widespread over the past two or 
three decades. This notion encourages marketers to optimize the infectiousness of the 
ideas that they are promoting by adjusting the factors that go into spreading the social 
epidemic. This strategy has shown extraordinarily good results for many marketers, and 
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illustrates the benefits of considering ideas to be contagious like viruses or other 
infectious diseases. 
As we consider the state of the Middle East at present, it becomes apparent that all 
of the factors necessary to spread the ideology of terrorism are present. In one sense, this 
is a mindset that is being marketed to a civilization, and the Western world stands to face 
more opposition if, indeed, the Islamic world does reach a tipping point where the 
ideology of terrorism becomes mainstream. It would be to our benefit within the United 
States to study the factors involved and find a way to do something to fend off the tipping 
point that could happen to turn the Islamic world as a whole against the Western world. 
The study of infection and epidemics in a purely physical sense is not merely a 
descriptive idea, however. While the epidemiology of ideas has mainly been an area 
researched by people who want to market new products or ideas, there are greater 
applications available in the understanding of classical epidemiology. One of the first 
things that would be useful to consider is the SIR model, a model of the percentages of 
the population that are susceptible, infected or recovered from a specific epidemic. This 
model has been used to study the nature of diseases and to put together approaches for 
combating those diseases. The second part of epidemiology that would be applicable is 
the idea of a strategy for the eradication of a disease that causes epidemics. These have 
been put together with greater and lesser success depending on the nature of the epidemic 
involved, but both polio and smallpox have been successfully treated and removed from 
most of the world with these strategies. 
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The mathematics of SIR models is complex and fills volumes of textbooks and 
current research. Deterministic, probabilistic, and blended approaches are available, and 
the factors that are tracked in the making of these models changes from one epidemic to 
another. However, from these models we can see that if one understands the nature of the 
epidemic that one is working with, one will have a better chance of being able to keep it 
from getting out of hand. These models should work descriptively as well as being 
prognostics, and should allow us to see the points at which intervention is needed. Just as 
a physical epidemic can get out of hand if people are not working to track its progress 
and developing strategies to contain it, this epidemic of an ideology of terrorism could 
become out of hand if it is not being tracked closely and modeled in this way. 
The susceptible population for the terrorist message has been pinpointed by much 
of the media and analysis available—it is largely the disaffected youth of the Middle 
Eastern region. What becomes more complex is discovering which of the people in this 
population are susceptible to or infected by the ideology of terrorism. Additionally, those 
who are recovered or immune from the ideology of terrorism need to be studied, in order 
that we have a better idea of what to look to do in order to “inoculate” people against 
terrorism. 
At the heart of a strategy to eradicate terrorist ideology is the need for charismatic 
leaders with a clear vision for the Middle Eastern region who have the clout and the will 
to lead their people into the future without terrorism. Additionally, the Western world’s 
insistence on standing behind leaders who do not have the interests of the larger region at 
heart has complicated the process. Part of the change that Western nations will need to 
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make is to understand that the modernization of the Islamic world will most likely not 
mean its Westernization, and that our best approach to encouraging a world free of the 
threat of terrorism from these transnational Islamist terrorist groups is to understand that 
we cannot make the entire world into a copy of our own civilization. Backing charismatic 
leaders who may not be in favor of Westernization but who are not anti-Western is more 
likely to be a successful measure than trying to force Western ideals into a different 
civilization. The key to finding a successful “inoculation” against the terrorist mentality 
is to look past our own cultural norms to see what the valid replacement ideologies are 
for the susceptible people. 
The fact that the current Clausewitzian paradigm of Western nations continues to 
be used as a set of presuppositions for model-building and problem-solving in the Global 
War on Terror, particularly in political and military circles, would seem to indicate that 
this paradigm works. However, the current situation in the Middle East, with the United 
States military stretched out and working nation-building tasks as well as fighting the 
ongoing war on terror, would seem to indicate otherwise. If we are fighting a 
Clausewitzian battle, we should be seeing political and utilitarian results. Instead, we 
fight people who continue to fight us even after any rational model (by Western 
standards) would indicate that they surrender and cut their losses. Even though we have 
demonstrated superior firepower and the will to defend ourselves, we continue to 
encounter threats of action. These are not Clausewitzian strategies that our opponents are 
using, and by modeling them as such, we do only ourselves a disservice. 
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Instead, we need to look at the aspects of the terrorist message, as well as the 
context in which it is being relayed and the people who are relaying it, and check the 
message for its infectiousness. If we accept the spread of terrorist ideology within the 
Middle Eastern region as a social epidemic, then we can start to use the tools developed 
within epidemiology to characterize the epidemic and to work out strategies to fend off a 
lethal epidemic that spirals out of control. Much as epidemiologists develop methods to 
defend against a possible outbreak of SARS or the Asian bird flu, we need to be working 
on methods to control the spread and, optimally, to eradicate the disease of terrorism. 
Once this switch has been made, models for counterterrorism, particularly those 
that work with resource allocation and optimal stopping, may well be changed. The 
expected results of given strategies would have to be recalibrated, and as parallels are 
made between the spread of infectious ideas and the spread of viruses, we will be better 
able to understand what it is about the terrorist mentality that infects the susceptible 
population. Additionally, we may be able to leverage marketing strategies to do some 
spreading of a different message, one that is not hostile to Americans, so that the same 
susceptible population has a chance to be “inoculated” against the terrorist mentality with 
another set of ideas about how to fix the problems of the present. 
Switching our assumptions to reflect a change in our conception of terrorism from 
a political and utilitarian war of ideologies to a struggle to eradicate—or at least to 
slow—a social epidemic would have both positive and negative consequences. The 
negative consequences are primarily centered on the costs of switching to a new 
framework, because change means expense and difficulty. However, the positive 
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consequences of that type of switch would seem to outweigh the immediate problems the 
switch would entail. 
Any fundamental shift in assumptions usually means an initial outlay of costs in 
order to update existing models and strategies to work with the new assumptions. It is 
possible that many of the legacy approaches to modeling counterterrorist activities and 
developing strategies to limit terrorist activities would be unable to be salvaged and thus 
would have to be replaced with newer tactics and strategies. Some of the models that we 
use to deal with the war on terror might become out of date and need replacement, and 
this would mean time and allocation of resources. In the short term, it could be costly. 
However, with a longer view, the costliness of switching to new assumptions is 
overshadowed by the potential benefit of making that switch. Our frustrations with the 
ongoing struggle against terrorists are ample evidence that fighting a utilitarian war with 
these groups is not going to work. Much as the military has always done, we are 
attempting to fight the last war in the present one. We get bogged down in the details of 
rebuilding all the nations that we have had to fight, and the military continues to be 
deployed to more and more countries around the world. It would appear that the current 
paradigm is headed for a breakdown. If that happens, it could be disastrous, and 
switching to thinking of this fight as the fight to contain and eventually eradicate a 
potentially lethal epidemic that is threatening to spiral out of control is one mental shift 
that could help to turn things around. 
Applying the concepts of epidemiology to the spread of ideas is not a new notion, 
but it has been applied at present in only a limited fashion. The bulk of the application 
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seems to be in the realm of marketing, where advertisers seek to leverage the power of 
person-to-person communication instead of relying on unpredictable and increasingly 
ineffective mass marketing techniques. We have a good basis for a descriptive 
application of epidemiology to the spread of the ideology of terrorism. 
On the other hand, very little exists that attempts to apply the notion of disease 
control and/or eradication to the spread of ideas. Much of this is because at present the 
research into epidemics of ideas centers on ideas that people desire to spread. However, 
as we consider ideas and mindsets that we do not want to spread—those that make people 
likely to become terrorists—we will need to seek out the way in which epidemiological 




1.3 Scope of Research 
 
This study is a development of the idea of how to change the assumptions 
inherent in our models of terrorism and counterterrorism. Using the models and 
methodologies that exist within the field of epidemiology, the following chapters develop 
the notion that terrorist ideologies are an epidemic of ideas. At present, the numbers 
available are only notional; while a wealth of studies have been written about fighting 
terrorism as a war, and about how to model and counter biological epidemics, little 
besides marketing books has been written about epidemics of ideas. 
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Using a new perspective on terrorism, as an epidemic rather than a war, 
encourages a reframing of the questions at the heart of the study of the War on Terror. 
This study takes this notion and makes an initial application of the wealth of models and 
information within the field of epidemiology to the notion of countering terrorism. While 
it is still an initial application of a new idea, it has promise as a new paradigm for the 
fight against terrorists, especially considering the fact that most of the existing 
approaches to counterterrorism have been less than optimal in their results. Eventually, 
further studies should be conducted to continue with this idea, so that meaningful 
numbers can be developed, and more accurate models can be built. This will take the 
cooperation of people within epidemiological and social sciences realms. From that point, 
the models can be used as baselines for optimization problems, including resource 
allocation, network flows, and other types of questions about the best way to work 
against the propagation of terrorist notions. 
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis continues in Chapter 2 to evaluate the literature that is relevant to the 
topic. The literature review includes looks at current techniques used to study terrorism, 
as well as at the roots of terrorism as they are currently understood. The review covers 
the models that are used in the field of epidemiology and considers what has been written 
about epidemic eradication strategies. In Chapter 3, the methodology of epidemiology is 
explained and illustrated, particularly through different applications of mathematical 
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models and discussion of eradication strategies. Chapter 4 goes on to apply the models 
and strategies described in Chapter 3 to the particular idea of terrorist ideology as an 
epidemic. Finally, Chapter 5 looks at the conclusions one can make based on the analysis 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Approaches to the problem of terrorism 
 
Now that fighting terrorism, particularly Islamist extremist terrorism, has become 
a priority for the American military, much has been written about the best ways in which 
to do so. A large portion of the literature on the subject focuses on resource allocation for 
counterterrorism. Hanes (2005) and Mitchell and Decker (2004) approach this problem 
with similar approaches. Also along this line of thought, Pruitt (2003) looks at 
prioritizing the factors involved in homeland security, applying a value-focused thinking 
approach to the problem. The General Accounting Office’s report on Combating 
Terrorism (2002) discusses recommended actions for antiterrorism at services’ 
installations.  
The Advisory Panel to Address Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism 
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003) takes a more specialized look at the 
domestic protection problem, setting priorities especially centered around the threat of 
WMD used within the homeland. Another specialized approach comes from Yao and 
Edmunds, et al. (2003), who consider optimal resource allocation in electrical network 
defense. Again, it takes a budgeting, risk-management inspired approach, as do many of 
the other papers on the subject. Much of the literature, indeed, seems to focus on the 
aspect of counterterrorism that exists within the homeland, in the sense of managing risk 
and optimizing systems for the lowest risk levels. In these estimates, one allocates 
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resources as a response to terrorist actions, or to prevent the occurrence of such actions 
on domestic soil. While such an approach has value, especially in setting priorities 
between competing options, it can also be myopic, because it ignores the side of 
counterterrorism that involves action overseas. 
Horowitz and Yaimes (2002) also take a risk-based approach to modeling actions 
that relate to counterterrorism. Their analysis involves the risks associated with 
intelligence gathering and then works through building scenarios which are then assessed 
for their risk factors. Much of this centers around Bayesian analysis of the probabilities of 
certain events, aggregated over decision trees that are developed from the scenarios.  
Another approach to the problem of terrorism centers on the idea of applying 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) to terrorist networks, modeling influence factors. Renfro 
(2003) takes this type of approach to model the social network within the Iranian 
government, showing that when one works through the factors involved, the most 
obvious pressure points are not, after all, the most influential nodes in the influence 
network. Rosen and Smith (1996a, 1996b, and 1996c) work through the methodology of 
influence net modeling, using Bayesian analysis of probabilities and a computer approach 
to aggregating probabilities in order to detect sensitivity and pressure points within the 
influence networks. Modeling social networks of terrorists has great promise, but within 
the applications of SNA, there is so little consensus on the appropriate quantification of 
relationships, and what has been done tends to be somewhat arbitrary. Social networks 
have been used by social scientists to describe networks of individuals, but have not been 
used for mathematical modeling of the networks to any great extent so far. 
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Some authors approach the question of counterterrorism by modeling it in a 
game-theoretic mode. Mia Bloom (2004) discusses the factors that make suicide terror a 
“rational choice” when a person or group considers options for competition or conflict. 
Yaimes and Horowitz (2004) create a model based on game theory for counterterrorism 
intelligence analysis. It incorporates some of the same Bayesian risk analysis that some of 
the papers mentioned previously have used, but puts that analysis into a game model 
instead of an influence network.  
Another perspective on counterterrorism can be found in an analysis of terrorist 
organizations’ centers of gravity. Schweitzer (2003) does this with Al-Qaeda, discussing 
the foundational pillars of their brand of extremist Islamist ideology. His particular focus 
is on what makes the ideology possible, and how an information campaign could 
adequately “attack” that center of gravity. This type of analysis is useful, if still 
influenced by its own Western perspective. As the different models of terrorism and 
counterterrorism show, a better understanding of the problems at the core of terrorism is 
needed in order for those who want to counter the problem to make any progress. 
 
2.2 Roots of terrorism 
 
Much of the literature on the subject of the roots of terrorism suggests that the 
current dire economic outlook for the youth of the Middle East and other factors such as 
hunger and repressive regimes are largely to blame for the grassroots support for terrorist 
groups. Blomberg, et al. (2004) make their model of terrorism using these assumptions, 
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setting it up as an economic model. Garfinkel (2003) works off the assumption that 
economic factors are the motivating forces behind terrorism, modeling probabilities of 
terrorist action based on this assumption. This sort of thinking is facilely Western in 
nature, however, and oversimplifies a much more complex set of causes and effects. 
Politics and economics certainly play a part in the larger picture of what is causing 
terrorism to escalate, especially among groups with roots in the Middle East. However, if 
these were the only causes, we would expect to see similar situations among the rest of 
the world’s poor and downtrodden people. And this we have not seen at present. Thus it 
would appear that a belief that terrorism can be eradicated by simply remedying the 
political and economic conditions within these countries is oversimplified. 
Some authors see the roots of terrorism as being economic in nature, while others 
perceive them as something psychological in nature. Borum (2003) discusses the 
development of an extremist mindset, discussing the steps that take place as such a 
mindset is formed. He goes through the basic four stage model that justifies terrorist acts 
of violence. First, the person or group identifies an undesirable event or condition, then 
they frame it as an injustice, then blame some target for the existence of that event or 
condition, and last vilify or demonize the scapegoat. (Borum, 2003: 7-8) Michael J. 
Mazarr (2004) provides a similar analysis of the psychological factors at work that cause 
Islamic terrorism. His analysis, though, is rooted in an understanding of the current 
cultural predicament of the standard Muslim in a modernized world. His article concludes 
with a series of unconventional recommendations to propagate a “strategy of identity 
entrepreneurs” (Mazarr, 2004: 16) 
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Benjamin and Simon (2003) discuss the history behind groups such as Al-Qaeda 
and other extremist Islamist organizations, detailing the philosophical lineage of current 
movements. They work through the immediate history surrounding the September, 2001 
attacks, and link the current phenomenon of radical Islamism to its historical precedents 
and ancestors. In The Crisis of Islam (2003), Bernard Lewis discusses the history behind 
radical Islamist terrorism, but he also considers the cultural factors at work that make 
terrorism seem a viable alternative to these groups when they are incomprehensible to 
Westerners. In particular, he focuses on the fact that the nature of Islam has always been 
that of a unified church and state, which makes governments and revolutions look 
extremely different than their Western cousins. These authors show that there is 
something fundamentally different at the heart of the Islamic world that Westerners do 
not understand. That misunderstanding, as well, creates the opportunity for differences to 
inflame the existing rift between the civilizations. 
Another perspective on the forces at work that have caused the current clash 
between the Western world and some of the movements within the Islamic world is 
incorporated in Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (1996, 1993). Within this 
book, Huntington explores the notion that the nature of war has been changing 
throughout history, and that currently we are in the midst of a transition between the wars 
of ideology that were best exemplified by the Cold War and wars between civilizations. 
His definition of a civilization encompasses the things that bind together a culture such as 
religion, philosophy, shared history, and other similar factors. The Western world, with 
its Christian roots, forms one such civilization, the Islamic world another, the Orthodox 
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cultures of Russia and Eastern Eurasia another, and the Chinese yet another of these 
civilizations. 
Huntington points out that the fault lines of battle exist now, in a macroscopic 
scale, on the borders of these civilizations, and in a microscopic scale, the clashes are 
happening in places where the civilizations intersect, such as the Balkans, the division 
between Hindu and Muslim peoples that one sees in the Kashmiri region, and the 
ongoing struggles in Northern Africa. As globalization marches on, the forces of 
modernization are becoming increasingly dissociated from the force of Westernization, 
and countries that are increasing their technological capabilities are starting to turn to 
their own cultural roots as they seek the way to approach their futures with the new 
resources at their disposal. The cultural dominance that the Western world has 
traditionally held over developed countries, then, is waning, and more of the people 
within other civilizations are expressing their discontent with Western norms. 
We in the West still think that the goal of extending our cultural values of 
freedom, democracy and free market economics is something that other countries should 
embrace as well, and have incorporated this type of thinking into our rebuilding of the 
countries of Afghanistan and Iraq. However, it is likely that the people of another 
civilization see this influence as meddlesome and intrusive, and seen from that light, the 
increasing rumbles of discontent with the ongoing American presence in the Middle East 
can be understood, if not remedied. Huntington makes the point that the divisions 
between civilizations are likely only to grow more profound as the rest of the world 
continues to modernize and become wealthier. Thus it appears that approaching the war 
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on terror and expecting to rebuild the Middle East into a free-market democratic (in other 
words, Western) region is impractical. Expecting that the forces of modernization will do 
so naturally is equally problematic. 
If, then, we have reached a point in history where the Middle East is ripe for 
change and is not looking to the Western world for guidance in that change, where will 
the region look? The Islamic world, deep in the throes of modernization, is ripe to be led 
by visionary leaders who have a distinct path for the future mapped out. Some of the 
factors that make this region ripe for visionaries include the large numbers of 
disenfranchised youth, the return to the cultural roots of the region, and the psychological 
need for a narrative that can be provided by a leader who understands the region and the 
forces at work within it.  
As Harris (2002) points out in “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology,” much of what 
motivated the terrorist attacks of 9-11 was not political or utilitarian in nature. Instead, 
America was used as a prop in the greater story that these leaders were telling to their 
followers. The bringing down of the Twin Towers was, in effect, an act of high drama, a 
David bringing down Goliath situation. Instead of calibrating the attack for the effect it 
would have on America—whether the leaders of the country or the people within the 
country—the attacks were intended as a sweeping gesture that would capture the hearts 
and imaginations of the people of the Middle East, who were looking for something to 




2.3 Epidemiology of Ideas 
 
Thinking of a mindset, of a particular idea or ideology as an epidemic is by no 
means a new concept. In the book The Tipping Point (Gladwell, 2000), the author goes 
over much of the research that has been done over the past few decades into trend 
research and how ideas spread between people. Many other books have been written 
about the concept of “viral marketing” (creating word-of-mouth marketing that spreads 
between people as a virus would), permission marketing (Godin, 1999) and other such 
approaches to marketing. In a world that is oversaturated with advertisements, the notion 
of leveraging the infectious nature of new ideas between people has revolutionized the 
arena of marketing. Emanuel Rosen (2000) discusses The Anatomy of Buzz, and the 
notion of how one creates word-of-mouth marketing, detailing the strategies and the 
principles behind doing this. Al and Laura Ries (2002) make a similar point in their book, 
detailing the need to make ideas infectious on a person-to-person level. Seth Goden 
(2002) discusses the need for novelty and remarkableness in marketing—essentially a 
blueprint for making an idea or the conveyance of an idea more “sticky” or infectious.  
The typical breakdown of the factors that make an idea spread are the people who 
spread ideas, the nature of the message that conveys the idea, and the context of the 
message delivered. Once these factors are leveraged properly, an idea can be 
disseminated to enough people, remembered by them, and there will come a critical 
time—a tipping point—at which the idea will have reached saturation point and a trend 
will result or action will be taken. Trend research is the most innocuous of the 
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applications of this notion; taken further, one can see that fomenting of revolutions and 
coups often happen in the same way. 
Gladwell speaks of the people who are instrumental in the spread of an infectious 
message in a chapter called “The Law of the Few”. It is important to note that as one 
considers the spread of ideas, there are relatively few people needed to make an 
ideological epidemic take hold. The three specific types of people involved are what he 
calls Connectors, Mavens, and Salesmen.  
Connectors are people who have an exorbitant number of social contacts, due to 
factors including personality and their jobs. These people have larger numbers of friends 
and acquaintances than the average person, and keep up with their social networks. 
Because of this, their influence is spread over a much greater portion of the population. If 
the message in question gets to a Connector, it will have a better chance of reaching the 
number of people that it needs to in order to take hold and become an epidemic. 
The next type of person who spreads a social epidemic (or ideological epidemic) 
is what Gladwell calls a Maven. These people are well-schooled in their areas of 
expertise, and because they know what they are talking about, people that they know will 
listen to their advice and recommendations for products. If a good product reaches a 
Maven, he or she will relay the message, and his or her recommendation carries more 
weight with other people than a remark from any other person. 
Salesmen are the final type of people that Gladwell profiles as instrumental in the 
spreading of social epidemics. These people can move ideas farther simply by nature of 
their charm and persuasiveness. When convinced that they have a good idea that they 
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would like to recommend to others, these people have the resources to persuade those 
they speak to. In this sense, a Salesman will have a greater chance of making a message 
take hold when they speak to one of the people that they know, or even when they speak 
to people that they encounter by chance. 
Connectors, Mavens and Salesmen are the people who make social epidemics 
start to spread. These people are instrumental in the beginning of an ideological 
epidemic. It is clear that within the Islamic world, people such as Osama bin Laden may 
be Salesmen, where there are imams within mosques who are Mavens, and other 
Muslims who are Connectors, able to spread these ideas from one locale to another. 
However, while the people involved in an epidemic of ideas are instrumental, the idea 
being conveyed within an epidemic—the message—is pivotal as well. 
The important aspect of making a message work is in its packaging—a message 
needs to be “sticky” to be able to start a social epidemic. Gladwell highlights that while 
the need to make a message sticky is irrefutable, the challenge of what exactly will make 
the message sticky is much more complex. Marketers have been working with this 
difficulty as long as advertising has been used to sell products, and there is no hard and 
fast rule that always works. What Gladwell points out is that an adaptive and innovative 
approach at packaging a message that one wants to spread is what is necessary to make a 
message sticky in the first place, and then to continue to make it sticky. From the success 
of transnational terrorist groups within the Middle East to recruit and spread their 
message to the people of their region, it would appear that they are working on the 
stickiness of the messages that they wish to convey. Thus the nature of the message itself 
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is important as one considers its ability to start a social epidemic, but it is also important 
to keep in mind the context within which the message is being conveyed. 
The context of the message that one wants to start a social epidemic is as 
important as the message itself and the people who convey it. People are greatly 
influenced by their environments, as Malcolm Gladwell points out, and the environment 
within which one experiences a message is as instrumental in its ability to cause an 
epidemic of ideas as the message itself or who one hears the message from. This 
consideration leads Gladwell into an overview of sociological research into group 
behavior and the different ways that people are able and willing to behave given different 
situations. Additionally, he discusses how there is a magic number—150—that seems to 
be the typical size of a real social network for any person. If a group smaller than that 
number attaches itself to a particular idea, most of its members will go along, for 
community spirit, while in a larger group, people start to become divided and alienated. 
The cell structure of most terrorist groups and the inherently local aspect of much of what 
these groups do caters to this need for an appropriate context for the spreading of the 
message and the continuing of the social epidemic that is the ideology of terrorism.  
The other branch of the study of epidemics of ideas is the study of memetics. This 
somewhat controversial field of study looks at idea units—memes—as being in essence 
viruses of the mind, infectious agents that propagate through populations much as 
epidemics vector through populations. Aunger (2002) discusses this phenomenon as it 
occurs culturally, while Chilton (2005) discusses a particular case of ideas as viruses, as 
conveyed in the text Mein Kampf. While the field of memetics seems largely to be 
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philosophical and esoteric in nature, the basic central tenet of idea-units that are 
contagious much as viruses are contagious is a valuable insight. Specifically, this insight 
is how a particular meme or set of memes, like Islamist extremism, might be rightly 
thought of as an epidemic of ideas or a social epidemic that is raging through a part of the 
world. 
Thus as we consider what may move terrorism from being a containable problem 
to a full-fledged epidemic within the Middle East, we need to track these factors. The 
people who are spreading the ideology of terrorism, the packaging of the message of 
terrorist groups, and the context within which this message is being spread are all 
important pieces of the puzzle of which to take note. Marketers within the Western world 
have been able to leverage these factors very effectively as they work on word-of-mouth 
or “viral marketing”, and their success should give us an example of how this sort of 
process works. Understanding the cultural influences that make the “market” different in 
the Islamic world will be pivotal for an understanding of the possible success or failure of 
a terrorist epidemic, but it is something that needs to be tracked carefully. 
 
2.4 SIR models: Deterministic Modeling of Infectious Diseases 
 
The SIR model is one of a set of tools used by epidemiologists to understand the 
nature of a particular epidemic. The letters of the acronym stand for susceptible, infected 
and recovered, and refer to numbers of people within any given population that fall into 
one of those four categories in reference to the epidemic. A typical SIR model (shown 
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over time) can be seen in the figure below. This is a useful tool for tracking the progress 
of an epidemic, as well as to see the progress of the infection itself, with such 
characteristics as latency before symptoms, virulence of the infection, and other qualities. 
(Trottier and Philippe, 2001) 
 
Figure 1: SIR model of measles epidemic 
http://www.ispub.com/ostia/index.php?xmlFilePath=journals/ijid/vol1n2/model.xml
 
A SIR model, or other compartmentalized deterministic model of an epidemic, is 
based on modeling the rates involved in transmission of the disease, contact between 
members in the population, population growth, and rates of recovery. Hethcote (2000) 
discusses the mathematics involved in standard and more involved SIR models. Trottier 
and Phillippe (2001, 2002, and 2003) discuss deterministic modeling, such as SIR 
models, and the type of sensitivity analyses and repercussions of such tactics as 
immunization at birth. Li et al. (2001) discuss the relevance of adding vertical 
transmission into deterministic models, and show the resulting changes that occur within 
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the differential equations that make up the core of the deterministic model. The 
mathematics of these models are further explored and explained in Chapter 3. 
Modeling an epidemic is a useful thing to do in order to gain insight into the 
particular factors that make up that epidemic. Some diseases lend themselves, more than 
others, to being targeted for elimination from the global community. One of the ways to 
measure an epidemic’s potential for an elimination strategy is to look at the rates defined 
in the deterministic model (Kretzschmar et al, 2004). Once a meaningful model for the 
epidemic of terrorist ideology has been developed, it is likely that these rates could be 
defined.  
 
2.5 Infectious Disease Eradication Strategies 
 
Another aspect of epidemiology that has potential for application to the struggle 
against terrorism is the notion of a strategy for the eradication of a disease. Many of these 
have happened over time, with the most famous being the real eradication of smallpox. In 
the public health community, there is a distinction between the elimination of a disease 
(or elimination of infections) and the eradication of a disease. Elimination of a disease is 
defined as a reduction to zero of disease incidence in a particular geographic region as a 
result of deliberate efforts, while eradication is considered a permanent reduction to zero 
on a global scale of the incidence of infections. (Dowdle, 1999: 23)  
There are two types of eradication strategies applied to infectious diseases, mass 
vaccination and ring vaccination. (Kretzschmar et al, 2004: 832) The original plan to 
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eradicate smallpox was with mass immunization, which worked for much of the 
developed world, where there were the resources to do that, but when the effort spread to 
the developing world, it was not feasible to immunize the entire population of these areas. 
Instead, a new strategy was developed. When a new case of smallpox was discovered, the 
person would be isolated, as would the people who lived within a certain radius of that 
person. Additionally, house-to-house searches would be made in a wider radius in order 
to track the progress of the epidemic. All the people within the smaller radius would be 
immunized and tagged as potential outbreaks, and their names would be removed from 
the list of these once the incubation period for the illness had passed. Using this ring 
vaccination strategy, the people fighting to eradicate smallpox were able to concentrate 
resources and effort in more focused doses, and better able to allocate what they had 
available to the necessary places. In this way, a better smallpox elimination strategy was 
developed, and this eventually allowed health workers to eradicate the disease. Fenner 
(2002) discusses the particular features of smallpox, both biological and sociopolitical, 
that made it a good candidate for an elimination strategy such as was developed. At 
present, the world health community is concentrating efforts such as these to eliminate 
poliomyelitis. Joyner and Rogers (2001) and Aylward et al. (1999) discuss this effort and 
the particular characteristics of the poliovirus that render it a good candidate for 
elimination. 
If the ideology behind terrorism is an epidemic that has the potential to spread 
through large portions of the Islamic world, then we need to be able to not only know 
how it spreads, but also have a feel for what we can do to limit the spread of the epidemic 
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and, optimally, to eradicate that epidemic. With this goal in mind, it becomes apparent 
that more than marketing products could result from a careful application of 
epidemiological concepts to the question of the spread of the terrorist ideology. If we 
were to gain a good picture of the nature of the infection, using a SIR-type model and 
other characteristics of the ideology, and we were able to use that information to build a 
strategy for the eradication of the epidemic, we might have success in the fluid war on 
terror. Then we need to consider where the parallels between the terrorist ideology and a 




The question of how best to deal with terrorism has been tackled by many 
different authors in many different ways, particularly since the terrorist attacks on the 
United States in September, 2001. All sorts of policy and approaches to resource 
allocation and other ways to counter terrorism have been considered. However, most of 
the approaches that come from Western authors incorporate Western paradigms into their 
understanding of the problem of terrorism. Authors blindly assume that terrorism can be 
linked to poverty or other economic factors, or that a purely defensive approach is the 
best way to counter terrorism. 
Rational behavior, such as is assumed within Western confrontations, is expected 
from Islamist extremists, and when their cultural paradigms allow them to operate outside 
of rational expectations, many of the Western models of their behavior are made useless. 
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Because there is a fundamental divide between the cultures of the West and of Islam, the 
problem of terrorism must be approached in a different manner. 
To understand terrorism in a way that will allow people in the West to make 
appropriate models of the factors involved will require an understanding of the 
psychological and cultural underpinnings of extremist Islamic ideology. Unlike a state 
that fights a war in a pragmatic, policy-oriented manner, terrorists do not fight or recruit 
as Westerners might expect. It would do well to think of terrorism, or rather the ideology 
behind it, as an epidemic of ideas. 
Epidemics have been studied extensively by scientists; a whole field of 
epidemiology has grown around this study. Mathematical epidemiology uses 
mathematics to model the spread of epidemics, so that they can be understood and 
countered more effectively. If the ideology of terrorism can be understood as an epidemic 
of ideas, then modeling it as an epidemic and studying eradication strategies in light of 




Chapter 3: Mathematical Models of Infectious Diseases 
 
3.1 The SIR Model: An Overview 
 
Epidemiologists have over time developed an entire branch of epidemiology 
called mathematical epidemiology, which concentrates on modeling the spread of 
infectious disease mathematically. Different tools exist, tailored to the varying factors 
involved that the epidemiologists seek to track. However, a basic model that is relevant to 
our exploration of terrorism as a social epidemic is the classic SIR model. 
 






deaths deaths deaths 
Figure 2: SIR model flow diagram 
A SIR model takes the population that interests the epidemiologist and partitions 
it into several categories, denoted by the letters S, I, and R which, respectively, mean 
susceptible, infectious, and recovered. The categories are assumed to be mutually 
exclusive and, in the classic model, transitions only occur from S to I and I to R. This 
means that R, the recovered category, is an absorbing state and that eventually an 
epidemic will converge to this state, in a model where there are no birth and death rates 
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included (the SIR epidemic model, Figure 4). When birth and death rates are accounted 
for, there will be an equilibrium distribution of susceptible, infected and recovered 
populations (in the SIR endemic model, Figure 10). 
Similar partition-based models include MSEIR, SEIR, SIRS, SEIRS, and 
MSEIRS models. (Hethcote, 2000: 601) The extra categories included here are M, infants 
with passive immunity that transfers from their mother, who will transition into the 
susceptible category, and E, the class of individuals who have been exposed to the 
infection and are in a latent period before becoming infectious. SIRS, MSEIRS, and 
SEIRS models (any models with a concluding S) include a transition back into 
susceptibility for recovered individuals, with a corresponding rate of leaving recovery 
into susceptibility. 
For the sake of simplicity, our initial model of terrorism as an epidemic will be a 
simple SIR model. An argument could be made for inclusion of the E (exposed) category, 
a latent period where a person exposed to the “infection” of the terrorist mindset is not 
yet likely to convert others to that mindset. It would be difficult to retrieve meaningful 
numbers to approximate how long that latent period lasts, and it is unlikely that surveys 
exist with that sort of data. Because of these considerations, we will begin our exploration 
of terrorism as an epidemic by modeling it with a simple SIR model. 
Within these models, the common assumption to make is that the time of transfer 
from one compartment and into another is exponentially distributed. This assumption 
exploits the memoryless property of exponential distributions. In a standard differential 
equations model, the rates of transfer will be designated by terms such as δ, ε, and γ and 
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multiplied by the populations within their corresponding compartments: δM εE and γI. 
The number of people in the population who are still in the latent period t time units after 
entering it is a function of the rate of transfer, εE.  
P{time in E > t} = e−εt  
Because the expectation of an exponentially distributed random variable is the 
reciprocal of its rate, we have the following correspondences between the rates and the 
expected time within each of these three categories. 
Table 1: Expected times within categories M, E, and I 
1
∂  
Period of passive immunity (time within M category) 
1
ε  
Mean latent period (time within E category) 
1
γ  
Mean infectious period (time within I category) 
 
While movement between these categories is relatively simple to track, based on 
observations and statistics about the infection in question, when it comes to modeling the 
transfer into the infected category, more is needed to model the process mathematically. 
With that in mind, mathematical epidemiologists developed the threshold numbers for 




3.2 Threshold Numbers: R0, σ, and R 
 
Within an epidemic or endemic SIR (MSEIR, or SEIR) model, R0, the basic 
reproduction number, is the first threshold number to consider. R0 is the average number 
of secondary infections that result when a single infected person is introduced into a fully 
susceptible population. R0 is only defined at the beginning of an epidemic, but it relates to 
another significant number for SIR models, the contact number, σ. 
The contact number for a SIR model is defined to be the average number of 
adequate contacts that a typical infected individual would have during their entire time in 
the infectious category. An adequate contact is one of significant duration to produce a 
secondary infection when an infectious individual is exposed to a susceptible individual. 
Thus, at time t = 0, R0 = σ. Thereafter, σ is used in the mathematical characterization of 
the epidemic, rather than R0. This quantity, in turn, leads to the third important number 
used in mathematical modeling of epidemics, which is R, the replacement number. 
The replacement number, R, of a SIR model is defined as the average number of 
secondary infections that a typical infectious individual produces during the entire period 
of infectiousness. Again, at time t = 0, R = R0 = σ. 
Each of these threshold numbers behaves differently over time. After the time of 
invasion (t = 0), R0 ceases to be defined. For most models, σ remains constant throughout 
the time of the infection. The exception to this rule is in models where after the infection 
has been introduced, new classes of infections arise with reduced infectiousness. In this 
case, σ would become smaller as the epidemic continued over time. However, this type 
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of model is used rarely; typically σ is treated as a constant. R, however, will always 
decrease over time within a SIR model. As the susceptible population decreases, the 
number of infections that an infectious individual can produce will continue to decrease 
proportionately. 
Thus, at t = 0, R0 = σ = R. Over time, though, R0 becomes undefined, and σ 
remains constant while R decreases, because after the time of invasion, only a fraction of 
the people that any infected person has adequate contact with will be susceptible to 
infection. We can combine these results into the following formula, true for all SIR 
(MSEIR, or SEIR) models. (Hethcote, 2000: 601-604) 
R0 ≥ σ ≥ R  
 
 
3.3 The Epidemic SIR Model 
 
Given the compartments and parameters that we have discussed above, the table 
below summarizes the important notation that characterizes a SIR model. Note that the 
fractional representations of the population should add up to 1. Thus s + i + r = 1, a fact 
that the differential equations that set up the model draw upon. Note that this is the 






Table 2: SIR Model Notation 
S Number of individuals within the S (susceptible) compartment 
I Number of individuals within the I (infectious) compartment 
R Number of individuals within the R (recovered) compartment 
N Number in total population (S + I + R = N) 
s Fraction of population that is susceptible (s = S/N) 
i Fraction of population that is infectious (i = I/N) 
r Fraction of population that is recovered (r = R/N) 
R0 Basic reproduction number (or rate) 
σ Contact number 
R Replacement number 
t Time, an independent variable 
 β Average number of adequate contacts of an individual per time unit 
γ Rate of transfer out of I category 
 
The definitions above lead to several relevant facts about the categories and rates 
within the model, some of which are detailed below. 










Contact number is equivalent to contact rate, β, multiplied by mean 
length of infection, 1/γ. 
s(t) = S(t)
N  
Susceptible fraction of population 
i(t) = I(t)
N  







Average number of adequate contacts with infectious individuals for 








⎟ S = β Nis
 
Average number of new cases per time unit, based on S = Ns being 
the total number of susceptible individuals within the population 
 


















R(0) = R0 ≥ 0  
This model, assuming a short time span, includes no births and deaths. When one 
divides the equations above by the total population (N, a constant in the epidemic model), 





s(0) = s0 ≥ 0  
d i
dt





r(0) = r0 ≥ 0 
Note that r(t) = 1 – s(t) – i(t). Thus we have that the solution curves to these 
equations fall within the triangular region T, known as the phase plane for the epidemic 
model, where 




1/γ = 3 
σ = 3 
i(t) 
s(t) 
Figure 3: Phase plane portrait of epidemic SIR model 
Note that when σ = 3 and 1/γ = 3 (days), the paths over time curve from the right 
side of T to the left, eventually dying out as i(t) = 0. 
The same functions can be seen in the graph below, where s(t) and i(t) are shown 
against time. The tendency of a typical epidemic is for i(t) to peak and then die down, as 
the susceptible fraction reaches a steady-state number.  
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1/γ = 3 




Figure 4: Susceptible and infected population proportions over time 
When σ increases, the peak proportion of the population that is infectious 
increases dramatically. This peak of infected population happens in a shorter period of 
time, but the duration of the epidemic becomes correspondingly shorter. Figure 5 and 





σ = 9 
i(t) 
s(t) 






Figure 6: Higher contact number SIR model over time 
 
Conversely, when σ decreases, the peak infectious proportion of the population 
becomes much smaller. Because the proportion of infectious individuals is not large 
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enough at any point to expose the entire susceptible population to infection, the infection 
tapers out before the susceptible population is reduced to proportions near zero. When σ 
is small enough, an epidemic’s end state will result in only part of the population having 
been exposed to the infection. Figure 7 and Figure 8 graphically illustrate the impact of a 
low contact number for an epidemic. 








σ = 1.5 
i(t)
s(t)








Figure 8: Low contact number SIR model over time 
The solution paths within T, characterized by the following equation 









σ s  
Equilibrium points (the end state) can be found along the s axis in the phase plane 
portrait. These are neutrally unstable for s > 1/σ and neutrally stable for s < 1/σ. 







3.4 The Endemic SIR Model 
 
An endemic model accounts for births and deaths within the population and thus 
tracks an infection over a potentially longer time span than the epidemic model. If 
nothing else, after an entire recovered generation dies out, the new generation will 
become fully susceptible again, leaving the population open to another epidemic. The 
behavior of endemic infections is actually more complex than this, however. 
The model for the endemic SIR model is very much the same as for the epidemic 
model, except that it incorporates a birth and death rate. The birth rate, μN, balances the 
death rate, also μN. N = S + I + R, which implies that μN = μ(S + I + R) = μS + μI + μR. 
Because of this, μS, μI, and μR are the death rates within susceptible, infectious, and 
recovered categories, respectively, in the SIR endemic model. This assumption ensures 
well-behaved movement within the model but is somewhat optimistic; in our terrorism 
example it is quite likely that the population is growing exponentially. The mean lifetime 
for a given individual is 1/μ, which can be found easily from demographic reports about 
regions of interest. 
The initial value problem is set up as follows: 
dS
dt
= μN− μS− β IS
N






− (γ + μ)I
 
I(0) = I0 ≥ 0 
d R
dt
= γ I− μR
 




Because the proportions of the population are assumed to remain constant 




= μ − μs− β is
 
s(0) = s0 ≥ 0  
d i
dt
= β is− (γ + μ)i i(0) = i0 ≥ 0  
d r
dt
= γ i− μr
 
r(0) = r0 ≥ 0 
 
The threshold numbers are slightly different for this model as well: 
R0 = σ =
β
(γ + μ)   
where 
1
(γ + μ)  
is the average death-adjusted infectious period 
 
Behavior within an endemic model tends to alternate between rapid epidemic 
outbreaks and slow regeneration of the susceptible class. As time continues, an endemic 







Figure 9 below shows the characteristic path of a solution within the phase plane, 
spiraling toward an endemic equilibrium. In this case, the average lifespan is 60 days, in 





γ = 13 
μ = 160  
β = 12 5 
i(t) 
s(t) 
Figure 9: Endemic SIR model phase plane 
In Figure 10, below, the damped oscillation in the infectious population becomes 
clearly visible. After the first peak of epidemic outbreak, the susceptible population 
gradually grows, due to birth rates in the susceptible category. When the susceptible 
proportion of the population reaches a high enough point, another epidemic peak occurs, 
but this time the peak looks characteristic of an epidemic with a smaller contact rate. 
Because the secondary epidemics when the susceptible proportion of the population is 
reduced, this effectively reduces the rate at which any infectious person is making 
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adequate contact with susceptible people—because he or she will also be encountering 
recovered (and thus immune) individuals. 
 











Figure 10: Endemic model over time 
A more typical endemic model would characteristically show the infectious 
population becoming negligible over time, as a result of the reduction of the birth (and 
death) rate, μ. When an infection occurs over a period of days (or weeks), and expected 











γ = 13  
μ = 1600  




Figure 11: Typical paths for an endemic phase plane 
 
3.5 Adding age groups to the SIR model 
 
Because epidemics often affect different age groups differently, epidemiological 
models often incorporate partitions between different age groups, in order to better show 
the rates at which the disease affects these age groups. With a standard infection, it is 
likely that an older individual will have more resistance to the disease, and contact rates 
can vary between different age groups. Just as the endemic model incorporates another 
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level of detail to the model, SIR models that incorporate age groups add another layer of 
detail to the picture of the infection in question. 
Age is treated as an independent variable, just as time is, and can be handled as 
either a continuous function or stepwise as a series of age groups. We will choose the age 
group approach as it is easier to collect and report statistical data about age groups than to 
create continuous functions that express birth, death, and recovery rates in terms of age. 
Age group models typically involve an assumption of exponential population growth 
(Hethcote, 2000: 619-620), modeled by the following equation, where  
N(t)   size of the population at time t 
N’(t)   rate of change of the population at time t 
b  mean natural birth rate 
d  mean natural death rate.  
 
′ N (t) = (b − d)N(t) 





Given that our population is growing (or shrinking) exponentially, we assume the 
distribution of proportions within the populations of n different age groups remains 
constant. Let Pi denote the proportion of the total population that is in age group i, where   








This leads to the understanding that the total number of individuals within each 
age group, Ni, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, can be found with the following equation. 
(Hethcote, 2000: 635) 
N i(t) = e
qt Pi  
 
Note that in the SIR model, where si = Si/Ni, ii = Ii/Ni, and ri = Ri/Ni, we have the 
following property. 
  Pi = si+ ii+ ri  ∀  i ∈ {1, ,n} 
Part of the problem of modeling age groups is the underlying assumption that 
contact rates (which previously we modeled as a constant rate, β, for all individuals 
within the system) will be different between the differing age groups. Thus we have a 
new set of rates that we will model as follows. 
Table 3: Contact rates in the age category SIR model 
β i  The contact rate between individuals in the same age group 
βi ˜ β j  The contact rate between individuals in separate age groups 
 
The total force of infection for each age group is λi, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This is 
equivalent to the rate of contact across all age groups multiplied by the number of 
infected in each of those age groups, and is the more complex variant of β that we used in 
our previous equations. (Hethcote, 2000: 635) 
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λi = β i ˜ β j
j=1
n
∑ i j ,  where β i ˜ β i = β i
 
Note that instead of using the notation i jβ β , the two age category model 
developed later will use the notation ijβ , because it is simpler to understand. The table 
below details the meaning of each of these rates. 
Table 4: Meanings of β rates 
11β  The rate at which infectious individuals in group 1 infect susceptibles in group 1 
12β  The rate at which infectious individuals in group 2 infect susceptibles in group 1 
21β  The rate at which infectious individuals in group 1 infect susceptibles in group 2 
22β  The rate at which infectious individuals in group 2 infect susceptibles in group 2 
 
Another rate that we need to be concerned with in the age category SIR model is 
the rate at which individuals leave age category i and enter category i + 1. This rate is 
labeled ci, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This rate must be distinguished from the death rate, di, 
at which people in category i are dying when they are within that age group.  
The flow diagram of the two-category model is detailed in Figure 12 below. This 
illustrates all the important states that any particular individual can exist within and the 





s1 i1 r1 
s2 i2 r2 
c1 c1 c1 
c2 + d2 c2 + d2 c2 + d2





(c1 + d1)P1 
Figure 12: Age category model flow diagram 
With these equations and the terms that we have previously defined, we are ready 
to set up the differential equations that define our age group model. This model is 
characterized by a set of 3n equations, with n being the number of age groups within the 
model. Note that the  
d s1
dt
= (c1 + d1 + q)P1 − [λ1 + c1 + d1 + q]s1  
d i1
dt










= ci−1 si−1− [λi + ci + di + q]si
 
i ≥ 2 
d ii
dt
= ci−1 ii−1+ λi si− [γ i + ci + di + q]ii
 





= ci−1 ri−1+ γ i ii− [ci + di + q]ri
 
i ≥ 2 
 
This definition of equations can be simplified, in the two-category case, to the 
equations below. For the sake of example, we take the case where population growth rate 
is zero. That is, there is a static population size and the rate at which people enter the 
system is the same as the rate at which they leave the system. 
d s1
dt




















= c1 r1+ γ 2 i2− [c2 + d2]r2
 
 
Demographic data is available for the proportions of the population within age 
groups, Pi, and the death rates within each age category, di. The rate at which people 
leave each category and enter the next, ci, can be calculated by the length of time that 
they spend within each age group. The final age group’s exit rate, cn, or in this case c2, 
has to be calculated so that the rate at which people leave the final age group is equal to 
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the rate at which they enter it. Note that, in the final category, cn just means the rate at 
which individuals exit the system. For the two-category model, this means 
c1P1 = (c2 + d2)P2  
 
Note that our initial values, shown in Table 5 below, include a larger category P1 
than P2. For the example problem, we assume that age group 1 dies at a slower rate than 
age group 2, but it sustains the infection for a longer time than the second age group. 
Additionally, while each age category is infected by members within itself at the same 
rate, members of category 2 will have a greater likelihood of infecting those of category 1 
than vice-versa. 
Table 5: Two age group SIR model initial values 
1 0.6P =  2 0.4P =  
1 11 1 12i i2λ β β= +  2 21 1 22i i2λ β β= +  
11 0.75β =  12 1.0β =  




γ =  2
1
2




d =  2
1
100



























Figure 15: Two age group SIR model phase plane for category 2 only 
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One can clearly see in the age group phase planes that the initial values that we 
have set have changed the outcome for the different age categories. In particular, the 
longer time of infection for the first age bracket makes the curves in the phase plane have 
a much more spiral nature than they do in the second age bracket. Additionally, one can 
see that the systemic equilibrium for the different age categories is going to be different 
for each. In this model, the first age group converges to an endemic equilibrium with a 
higher proportion of infectious individuals than does the second age group, because of the 
longer duration of the infection and the inflow of susceptible individuals. 
The next set of valuable information about the age group model is what the 
different populations are doing over time. With this in mind, we graph the value of the 
populations over time, assuming a negligible number of infected population (0.05 of the 



























Figure 18: Susceptible, infectious, and recovered fractions of category 2 
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One can see that the shapes of the curves associated with each part of the 
population are different. In this case, the overall epidemic occurs with more force in the 
younger part of the population, which consequently results in an endemic equilibrium 
with a larger steady-state number (relative to the total population of the younger age 
category) for infected and susceptible groups, and a smaller equilibrium state for the 
recovered portion of the younger population. However, since one can assume that a 
younger person will eventually transition into the older category, this makes sense; the 
younger age bracket is steadily losing people from its later categories to the older age 
bracket. Since the older category includes the absorbing state, r2, it has a much larger 
proportion (relative to the population) of recovered individuals than does the first 
category. 
Both epidemic and endemic models serve a purpose, and have potential 
application to the problem of terrorism spreading as a social epidemic. It is a matter of 
which parts of the problem that one chooses to focus on that determines which model one 
would use. An epidemic model looks at a short-term problem and focuses on what the 
initial outbreak of an infection is going to look like, while an endemic model tends to be 
of more use to determine what the eventual steady-state distribution of the infection will 
become. An endemic model assumes a longer time horizon than an epidemic model does. 
Additionally, the age category model has potential use to model the spread of the 
“infection” of the terrorist mindset. This would allow partitioning of the entire population 
of a given region into more and less susceptible groups, and might give a more detailed 
picture of the dynamics involved in the spread of terrorist ideology. However, this model 
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also requires more initial settings for rates, and while many of them come directly from 
known demographic data, others need to be estimated.  
 
3.6 Applying the partition principle to varying levels of influence 
 
Using similar partitioning methodology to that we used to develop the age 
category model, we develop a model based on categories of influence. This type of model 
will look similar to the age category model, but will incorporate the understanding that 
the proportion of highly influential individuals will be very much less than that of normal 
people in the population. However, these influential individuals can be expected to have 
much greater infectiousness, which will change the force of infection values. This 
incorporates the notion that some individuals will have a much greater tendency of 
carrying the infection to others, the idea that The Tipping Point emphasizes in its 
discussion of the people factors involved in epidemics of ideas. (Gladwell, 2000) 
Partitioning can also be used to model the way an epidemic spreads through 
multiple populations, such as in different regions or cities, because in this way the 
differing rates of interaction can be illustrated. (Zaric and Brandeau, 2002) Such 
partitions can become very complicated, especially when rates of contact between 
populations are factored in, because the flow is not simply out of one population and into 
another, but in and out of both. SIR models that incorporate partitioning thus have the 





3.7 One step further: the effects of immunization on the model 
 
Though SIR models are based on the assumption that the only way out of the 
susceptible category is into the infected category, it makes sense to take the model one 
step farther. In this immunization SIR model, we theorize that individuals within the 
recovered category are capable of having a positive influence on susceptible individuals. 
This means that, if exposed for a sufficient length of time to a recovered person, a 
susceptible individual could be effectively “immunized” against the contagion in 
question. Immunization, in this sense, means that the disease never infected the 
individual. While this assumption would not make sense within a typical biological 
epidemic model, it can be incorporated into a model of an epidemic of ideas. In this case, 
one can expect the recovered category to be composed of people who have a positive (or 
neutral) influence on susceptible people. The main item of importance is that the 
influence of the recovered category will enable those who are susceptible to infection to 
bypass the infected state. In essence, their influence is an inoculation against the 
infection. 
This model will look very much like the model partitioned by influence, but will 
incorporate the effects of normal and highly influential people in both infectious and 
immunizing ways. Figure 19, below, is the flow diagram of this model. Category 1 stands 





s1 i1 r1 
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c1 c1 c1 










(c1 + d1)P1 
Figure 19: Partition model flow diagram with immunization effects 
While all our rates from before remain what they were before, there is an 
additional factor of the κ rates, which will be the forces of immunization for each of the 
susceptible groups. These can be defined as following: 
1 11 1 12 2 1 2 21 1 22 2( r r )s( r r )sκ α α= + 2κ α α= +  
 
The α values here measure the rates at which one population of recovered will 
immunize the susceptible population of the category in question. These α values are 
analogous to the β values associated with force of infection rates. 
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Table 6: Meanings of  α rates 
11α  The rate at which recovered individuals in group 1 immunize group 1 susceptibles 
12α  The rate at which recovered individuals in group 2 immunize group 1 susceptibles 
21α  The rate at which recovered individuals in group 1 immunize group 2 susceptibles 
22α  The rate at which recovered individuals in group 2 immunize group 2 susceptibles 
 
The immunization factor will change the shape of the curves associated with the 
epidemic, depending on what initial values are chosen. The equations below and the rates 
in Table 7 set up the influence model with immunization. 
d s1
dt
= (c1 + d1)P1 − [λ1 + κ1 + c1 + d1]s1
d i1
dt





















Table 7: Influence model with immunization initial values 
1 0.99P =  2 0.01P =  
1 11 1 12i i2λ β β= +  2 21 1 22i i2λ β β= +  
11 0.75β =  12 100β =  
21 0.2β =  22 25β =  
1 11 1 12r rκ α α= + 2 2 2 21 1 22r rκ α α= +  
11 0.5α =  12 75α =  
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s1 + s2  
Figure 20: Influence category SIR model with immunization phase plane 







r1(t) + r2(t) 
s1(t) + s2(t) 
i1(t) + i2(t) 
time 
Figure 21: Influence category SIR model with immunization over time 
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Since normal people, who compose P1, are such a large percentage of the 
population, the graphs barely change for their statistics considered alone. However, the 
difference between these graphs and the graphs for influential people is considerably 
greater, and one can see a great difference between the epidemic at large compared to that 
within those people of influence. One can see this influence in Figure 22 and Figure 23 
below. 









Figure 22: Highly influential individuals phase plane 
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Figure 23: Highly influential individuals over time 
Modeling immunization in this way, the epidemic curve scarcely changes in 
shape. However, instead of settling to an endemic equilibrium point, the curves for s(t) 
and i(t) trend toward zero, meaning that r(t) trends toward 1. In this sense, the growing 
influence of the recovered population will eventually obliterate the incidence of the 
infection. This is not a realistic expectation to make about a biological epidemic, but 
when one is modeling a social epidemic, it could be close to the mark. When an idea 
stops having followers, it tends to die out. 
For most epidemiological models for biological infections, immunization is 
modeled by reducing the inflow into the susceptible category and correspondingly 
increasing the inflow into the recovered category. Trottier and Phillippe (2003) discuss 
the expected change that inoculation will have on an epidemic, showing that it lengthens 
the intervals between epidemic outbreaks (initial and following peaks in a model like 
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Figure 10), and each epidemic outbreak is smaller in scale until they disappear altogether. 
Modeled into the differential equations for the SIR model, this change is a reduction of 
the inflow into the susceptible category. The equations that make up an endemic SIR 
model become the following, where μ is the rate of people entering (and leaving) the 
system, γ is the rate at which people recover from infection, β is the rate at which people 
become infected, and p is the rate of immunization of the susceptible population. 
d s
dt
= μ(1− p) − μs− β is s(0) = s0 ≥ 0  
d i
dt
= β is− (γ + μ)i
 
i(0) = i0 ≥ 0  
d r
dt
= μp + γ i− μr
 
r(0) = r0 ≥ 0 
The disadvantage of modeling immunization this way is that it does not capture 
the influence that “recovered” individuals will have on susceptible individuals. Because 
ideas that are contrary to the epidemic in question are infectious (though perhaps less so 
than the epidemic), those who are “recovered” from the infection exert their influence on 
susceptible individuals. In that sense, our proposed model of immunization to a social 
epidemic makes more sense than the typical biological model. 
 
3.8 Applications of SIR models 
 
Not only is a SIR model descriptive of an epidemic, but it also can be used to 
solve problems related to the control of such epidemics. Zaric and Brandeau (2002) work 
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through a resource allocation problem based on a multiple population model. In their 
case, expected years of life for HIV/AIDS infected individuals are maximized, based on 
the assumption of a group of control measures that will reduce “risky behavior” 
(sufficient contact rates) within given populations. Alternately, they show, one can 
minimize the expected number of new infections over time, based on a dynamic 
allocation of resources into these control measures. The SIR model, in any form, shows 
the boundaries of the feasible region that any optimization problem for control measures 
would have to exist within. Thus, not only resource allocation problems, but control 
strategies could be evaluated over the modeled epidemic, once the changes that a control 
measure would have on a population are modeled appropriately. 
 
3.9 Infectious Disease Eradication: Necessary Conditions and Strategies 
 
3.9.1 Necessary Conditions for Eradication 
 
According to Frank Fenner (2002: 9-13), the necessary conditions that make a 
particular infectious disease a good candidate for eradication are as follows in Table 8. 
These factors, while targeted to biological infections, do have correlates when one 






Table 8: Factors contributing to eradication candidacy 
Severity (high mortality rates or terrible side effects) 
No animal reservoir of the virus/infectious agent 
Slight incidence of undiagnosable cases 
No recurrence of disease 
Limited number of subtypes 
Effective methods to confirm diagnosis 
A stable, effective vaccine is available 
Cases not infectious until diagnosable 
 
It is apparent that for an eradication strategy to be possible, the infection needs to 
be something clearly defined, easily and reliably diagnosed, and an effective vaccine 
needs to be available to use in any eradication strategy. Additionally, a perceived need for 
the eradication strategy needs to exist as well. If the world community does not agree that 
the disease is a threat sufficient to warrant a costly intervention, then containing the 
epidemic will be much more difficult. Assuming that these conditions exist for an 
infection, then there are different strategies available to effect the eradication of the 
disease. 
 
3.9.2 Eradication strategies 
 
The most straightforward strategy to eradicate a disease is mass vaccination. This 
has been applied regionally with good results for many of the common diseases such as 
smallpox, polio, mumps, measles, rubella, and even chickenpox. However, such a 
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strategy depends on the existence of enough vaccine and enough economic resources to 
pay for the vaccine for the entire population. Additionally, until the infection is 
eradicated globally, mass vaccination still needs to be applied for all newborns into a 
population, so this is a high-cost but very effective strategy. 
However, when resources are limited and eradication is still sought, ring 
vaccination is the strategy of choice. This strategy depends on surveillance in all the 
affected regions and quick diagnosis of new infections. Once new infections occur, the 
social network surrounding the newly infected person is inoculated, usually measured by 
a radius of a certain distance from the home of the infected person. Outside that radius, 
house-to-house searches are made for signs of infection that may have come out that far, 
and if infection is discovered, the same set of actions are applied starting there. This 
strategy targets infections as they occur, and allows a much more limited amount of 
resources, both funding and vaccines. 
The success of ring vaccination is very much dependent upon the level of 
surveillance in the affected regions and the accuracy of diagnosis early on in an infection. 
This is why a disease prone to recurrence or difficult to diagnose early in its infectious 
stages would be difficult to eradicate with this sort of strategy. In the case of a less-
obvious infection, the only effective strategy would be mass vaccination. 
With any eradication strategy, the results may not be immediately observable. An 
infection that has become an epidemic usually will run its course. However, an 
eradication program will ensure that the disease does not become an endemic infection 
within a population, and will reduce the successive outbreaks of a disease. An eradication 
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program is a long-term solution to the problem of infectious diseases, not an immediate 




The mathematical models of epidemiology are diverse and can incorporate many 
different interactions of variables involved. The simplest form of these models, the SIR 
epidemic model, shows over the short term how a single epidemic will play out through 
time. An endemic model, which requires more entry data, also gives more information 
about the long term and where endemic levels of a disease can be expected to settle. 
These models can then be partitioned, either by age groups or by influence 
categories or by separate populations affected by the same epidemic. Conceivably, all 
these factors could be incorporated into one extremely large and complex model. These 
partitioned models, again, require more rates to determine the shape of the model, but 
they also give a more detailed picture of the epidemic in question when they are 
developed. 
SIR models also can be used to inform the application of eradication strategies to 
epidemics. The different characteristics of an epidemic are what make it a better 
candidate for one or another eradication strategy. All of this information that is 
incorporated into mathematical models of epidemics has direct use for modeling of an 





Chapter 4: Applying Epidemic Models and Strategies to Terrorism 
 
This chapter’s goal is to demonstrate how the mathematical epidemiological 
models developed in Chapter 3 may be applied to the epidemiology of ideas through 
several notional examples. 
 
4.1 The epidemic SIR model of terrorism 
 
The first challenge to modeling terrorism in a SIR model is to decide what is the 
population within which to model. Judging from the literature on the subject, the likely 
susceptible population to the terrorist mindset is that of males between the ages of 15 and 
35, approximately. (Urdal, 2004) There are terrorist leaders who are much older than that, 
but those leaders seem to be the exception rather than the rule, and even if older people 
might be sympathetic to the extremist mindset, they appear to be less likely to act on it. 
Another characteristic of the susceptible population is that it exists within the Muslim 
world; for the case of our model we will choose to model with the young male 
demographic within a single region. This is a notional model just to exemplify how 
epidemiological concepts could be applied to better understand the dynamics of the 
spread of terrorism. 
Within our young male regional population, then, we have to partition the 
population, N, into the classes of S, I, and R. Susceptible individuals are those who have 
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not yet been exposed to the terrorist mindset for a sufficient amount of time to become 
infected with it. For our model we will start with the assumptions that s0 = 1 and i0 = r0 = 
0. These will be starting conditions. Infective individuals are those who have been 
converted to an extremist Islamist mindset, who are ready and willing to be a part of the 
narrative that the terrorist leaders have presented them with. Finally, recovered 
individuals are those who have, in the past, been “infected” with the terrorist mindset but 
who have since changed their minds or become disaffected with that perspective on the 
world. We will proceed on the assumption that a recovered individual is not likely to 
become re-infected with the terrorist mindset.  
Table 9: SIR Model Notation 
S Number of individuals within the S (susceptible) compartment 
I Number of individuals within the I (infectious) compartment 
R Number of individuals within the R (recovered) compartment 
N Number in total population (S + I + R = N) 
s Fraction of population that is susceptible (s = S/N) 
i Fraction of population that is infectious (i = I/N) 
r Fraction of population that is recovered (r = R/N) 
R0 Basic reproduction number (or rate) 
σ Contact number 
R Replacement number 




Average number of adequate contacts of an individual per time 
unit 
γ Rate of transfer out of I category 
 
Unlike most of the diseases modeled by epidemiologists in SIR (or SEIR, or 
MSEIR) models, the time periods associated with the spread of terrorism are not typically 
measured in days. An adequate contact, one that would be sufficient to spread the 
“infection” to a susceptible individual, is likely to be one that is the result of weeks or 
months of exposure to an infectious individual. Additionally, once one is infected with 
the terrorist mindset, the time that one remains infectious is likely to be measured in 
months or years.  
Table 10: Notional rates for terrorist SIR model 
Time unit 6 months 
β 2 per time unit on average 
1/ γ 10 time units (5 years) on average 
σ 20 over the average “lifespan” 
 
Using these rates in the differential equations below, the epidemic model of the 
infection of terrorism can be seen in Figure 24 and Figure 25. Bear in mind that the rates 
are notional numbers. A more extensive study of how a person becomes “infected” by 
terrorist ideology and a development of more rigorous numbers would be needed to 
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develop models to rely on and predict with. However, the notional numbers can give a 





s(0) = s0 ≥ 0  
d i
dt


















Figure 25: Terrorism SIR epidemic model over time 
We can see that these assumptions leave us with a fairly steep epidemic curve, 
showing that the susceptible proportion of the population decreases rapidly and the 
infected portion peaks around five time periods, after which it slowly decreases. 
Modeling without birth and death rates, if we continued to model through time, the 
infected proportion should be expected to converge to zero eventually. This is, however, 
a simplistic representation of the population susceptible to terrorism. The problem of 
terrorism is not a short-term epidemic that can be expected to fade out, as experience has 
shown us over time, and thus modeling it as solely an epidemic, without accounting for 
the new people who will enter the system (and leave it), leaves an unrealistic picture of 
the problem at large. Our initial curves are most likely near correct, but when the rates of 
incoming and outgoing members of the system are added, the system will stabilize 




3.2 The endemic SIR model of terrorism 
 
An endemic model applied to terrorism gives us a longer time-scale look at what 
levels of infection are likely to become constant for the epidemic of terrorism. Assuming 
the rates that were used in the previous section, and adding μ = 1/40 time periods (20 
years), the equations below are used to model the epidemic. Since the population consists 
of a specific demographic group, we will consider the “lifespan” of a typical individual 
within the population to be 20 years, and use that number for 1/μ in the endemic version 




= μ − μs− β is
 
s(0) = s0 ≥ 0  
d i
dt
= β is− (γ + μ)i i(0) = i0 ≥ 0  
d r
dt
= γ i− μr
 
r(0) = r0 ≥ 0 
 
Table 11: Notional rates for endemic terrorism model 
Time unit 6 months 
β 2 per time unit on average 
1/ γ 10 time units (5 years) on average 
1/μ 40 time units (20 years) 




Since the model is exactly the same, except for the addition of rates into and out 
of the system, the model should look very similar to the epidemic model developed in the 
previous section. However, because this is an endemic model, it will converge to the 
endemic equilibrium of the infection, and will give a sense of what these numbers will 
mean in the long term given that rates are close to the notional ones chosen. The endemic 
equilibrium will give a sense of steady-state percentages of the population to expect to be 
infected with the terrorist ideology. This means that one can guess at levels of willing 
participants in terrorist activities, as well as how many people continue to be within the 
susceptible population. This model, if given reasonable estimates, could inform decision-













Figure 27: Terrorism SIR endemic model over time 
Using an endemic model shows more dynamics within the system, with the 
interesting outcome that the infected population, given these vital dynamics, can be 
expected to reach a steady-state distribution (the endemic equilibrium). This does show 
that the initial peak of terrorist mindset infection is the greatest; if our assumptions are 
reasonable, it would appear that it is likely that within a given population, the susceptible 
population will be rapidly exposed. After the initial exposure, the proportions of those 
likely to act on the terrorist mentality will decline until terrorists can be expected to make 
up only twenty percent or so of the population at any given time. While this is not good 
news—one might wish to see a smaller proportion of infected individuals—it does show 
that the initial surge of terrorist recruits cannot be something sustained. 
Assuming that the first 2.5 years (5 time units) of exposure to terrorist mindsets 
have already elapsed, it is conceivable that for any given population of young Muslim 
males, the “infected” proportions are already declining, rather than continuing to peak as 
some literature suggests. 
The benefit of such models is that one can conduct sensitivity analyses with 
regards to the targeting of parameters such as forces of infection and immunization, 
where even slight perturbations might make a great difference in the behavior of the 
model. It will be necessary to study the sociological makeup of the region of interest and 
the terrorists operating within that region to come up with numbers that have more 
objective value. With a sense of steady-state levels within the population, the next 
challenge is to model the system partitioned into its various component populations, so 
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that more complex interactions and dynamics within the system will become apparent in 
the model. 
 
4.3 Two age category model 
 
For this model we subdivide the 15 to 35 age group into two equal portions. 
Category 1 will be the 15-25 age group and Category 2 will be 25-35. We will assume 
that we have a youth bulge (Urdal, 2004) weighted on the younger side of the spectrum, 
and thus our percentages will be skewed accordingly over our 20-year spectrum. We will 
assume that a younger person is less able to “infect” an older person, and that an older 
person is less likely to become infected from either group. As well, we will assume a 
longer time period span for the infection of an older person—if they become convinced 
of the validity of their cause, they will be less likely to change their minds again later. 
The differential equations below and the rates in Table 12 set up the age category 
model for the epidemic of terrorist ideology. 
d s1
dt


























Table 12: Age category rates for terrorism SIR model 
1 0.7P =  2 0.3P =  
11 1β =  12 3β =  














































Figure 28: Two age category terrorism SIR model phase plane 













Figure 29: Two age category terrorism SIR model over time 
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Figure 28 and Figure 29 show the shape of the model when the rates from Table 
12 are used within the partitioned model. The entire population is accounted for in these 
figures, and it is evident that the model looks different than the endemic model. Adding 
the complexity of interactions within states makes the model look different than the 
endemic model developed in the section before. Each age category, as well, looks 
different when it is modeled separately, as one can see in the figures below. Since these 
are modeled as proportions of the total population, the partitioned models have different 
ranges for the values within the graphs. 
The younger age group, modeled this way, will have a higher steady-state 
incidence of both susceptible and infectious populations. The older group will have a 
much lower incidence of both, a fact that can be clearly seen as its levels over time are 
shown in Figure 33.  
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Figure 30: Age category 1 phase plane 
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Figure 31: Age category 1 over time 
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Figure 32: Age category 2 phase plane 












Figure 33: Age category 2 over time 
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From these notional numbers, one can see that our assumptions have changed the 
SIR model. The total population stabilizes to an endemic equilibrium that is very close to 
the numbers we achieved with the simpler endemic model. However, when one looks at 
the model by category, two very different dynamics can be observed. It is evident that a 
smaller chance of infection (β value) will curtail the effects of the epidemic to a large 
degree, though in this case the long period of infectiousness (γ value) still creates the 
peak of infectious population that is associated with an epidemic. 
 
4.4 Terrorism model partitioned by influence, including “immunity” 
 
Using the methodology developed for influence category models, we again 
partition the population, this time into category 1, normal, and category 2, highly 
influential, individuals. The second category could be thought of as people who have a 
large degree of connections to others, unusual persuasiveness, or merely those who can 
effectively use the media to gain the sufficient amount of exposure to “infect” or 
“immunize” their audience. An imam in a large mosque might be one such person, or the 
leader of a terrorist network who produces tapes that are distributed to local television 
networks. While this is only based on two categories of people, an argument could be 
made for having more partitions, based on local influence. 
While the first category is overwhelmingly the largest, the second category has 
such a large ability to persuade others that it makes its mark even though it has small 
numbers. We also assume that those with an extremist viewpoint will have more 
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likelihood of “infecting” people than those with a more moderate viewpoint have to 
“immunize” people. We base this assumption on the observation that the current state of 
the Islamic world seems to favor apocalyptic paradigms, and most moderate 
interpretations of Islam tend to be less apocalyptic in character than are the 
fundamentalist or extremist versions. 
The differential equations below and the rates in Table 13 set up the influence 
category with immunity model of the terrorist epidemic.  
d s1
dt
= (c1 + d1)P1 − [λ1 + κ1 + c1 + d1]s1
d i1
dt
















= c1 r1+ κ2 s2+ γ 2 i2− [c2 + d2]r2
 
 
Remember that λ and κ are defined as follows: 
1 11 1 12i i2λ β β= +  2 21 1 22i i2λ β β= +  




Table 13: Terrorism influence category model with "immunity" rates 
1 0.99P =  2 0.01P =  
11 1β =  12 200β =  
21 1β =  22 50β =  
11 1α =  12 75α =  




d =  2
1
100














γ =  2
1
20













s1(t) + s2(t) 
Figure 34: Terrorism influence model with "immunity" phase plane 







s1(t) + s2(t) 
r1(t) + r2(t) 
i1(t) + i2(t) 
time 
Figure 35: Terrorism influence category model with "immunity" over time 
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In this model, the breakdown diagrams do not differ significantly in shape from 
the diagrams for the entire population, so they have been omitted. 
The first item of note in this model is that the overall shape of the diagrams is 
very similar to that of the endemic model produced earlier. The difference we can see 
here is that the endemic model found a steady-state distribution with proportions of the 
population in a fixed ratio to one another, while this model shows an eventual trend of 
susceptible and infected populations down to zero, or very close. In one sense, this model 
incorporates a time limit into the epidemic, because if one assumes that any recovered 
individual will have the possibility of having an immunizing effect on susceptible 
individuals, the gradual trend toward a larger and larger recovered class (recovery is, 
after all, an absorbing state) will create its own epidemic of ideas. This secondary 
epidemic of ideas—but ideas that are not considered dangerous to the Western world—
can be thought of as the eventual replacement for the dangerous infection of terrorist 
ideology. 
In a sense, then, introducing a counter-paradigm to that of the terrorism 
propagators would be an eradication strategy. Just as biological epidemics have been 
eradicated by strategies created by the world health community (Dowdle, 1999: 23), it 
stands to reason that a social epidemic of extremist ideology could be eliminated by an 
eradication strategy. Of course, the stakes are high, and finding an “inoculation” that has 
a high probability to take hold would be difficult. Typical information operations and 
psychological operations that focus on promoting West-friendly ideas might never 
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achieve the “stickiness” needed to combat the much more tempting extremist ideology. 
(Mazarr, 2004) 
One can see from these models, however, that extremist ideology, like any 
contagion, could hold within itself the seeds of its own destruction, were the right 
approach toward eliminating it employed. The key to eliminating the steady-state levels 
of terrorists or, in our models, “infectious” individuals is to introduce a counter-epidemic 
of ideas that has a similar ability to propagate within the Muslim world. With such a 
strategy, the problematic epidemic of terrorist ideology might come to an end within a 
reasonable timeframe. 
 
4.5 Additional applications of a partitioned model 
 
A partitioned model could also be used to show the epidemic as it affects multiple 
populations over multiple time periods (Zaric, 2002) In this case the interactions are more 
complex, because flows between the partitions of the population are rarely going to be in 
one direction only. This will require another set of rates for interactions between 
populations. Additionally, all of these ideas could be used together to create a more 
complex problem. However, the more factors that are included into the model, the more 
difficult the solution becomes. 
SIR models have been used to define the boundaries of the feasible region for 
problems relating to epidemic control. When this has been done, one can start using the 
feasible solutions to an epidemic distribution to develop different controls over 
95 
 
epidemics. Some of these are resource allocation problems and some discuss 
minimization of new infections over a time horizon. With an understanding of the factors 
involved in the modeling of epidemics, operations research analysts could apply this sort 
of thinking to a model of the spread of terrorist ideology and potentially work out a 
strategy to limit and even to eradicate the ideology of terrorism. 
 
4.6 Eradication strategies applied to the epidemic of terrorist ideology 
 
As one considers the spread of the ideology of terrorism, it becomes apparent that 
this infection of ideas spreads like a biological epidemic. With that in mind, the strategies 
that have been used to eradicate infectious diseases take on new meaning. If 
immunization has a counterpart in the realm of ideas, it is likely the propagation of an 
alternate mindset from that which backs terrorism, something that is not necessarily pro-
Western, but is also not virulently anti-Western in nature. In short, the West needs to seek 
an alternate epidemic of ideas for the Islamic world that the people in the Western world 
can live with. This is not just a marketing scheme, however. 
The idea of mass-marketing a particular idea, or new epidemic, is an equivalent to 
the mass immunization strategy. Both require a good budget, extensive research and 
understanding of the markets into which they wish to inject their message, and adaptation 
and creativity to keep up with the easily-bored audience of the message in question. 
Because of these needs, a mass-marketing approach is probably not an optimal strategy to 
contain the epidemic of terrorism. 
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Ring immunization, though, has a promising correlation to the epidemic of ideas. 
It would require careful surveillance of the areas in question, however, to be workable. 
Any sign of “infection,” such as a person caught participating in terrorist activities, and 
the social network surrounding that person should immediately be explored for signs of 
infection. Law enforcement agencies likely already do this—albeit unofficially—as they 
track down the terrorist cells that have perpetrated acts of terrorism. There could be a 
careful inspection of the first-degree associates of the infected person, and then an 
alternate idea, tailored to the local culture, could be introduced into that group. Second-
degree associates should be carefully surveyed and tracked for signs of infection, and 
treated accordingly. 
Ring immunization, or its ideational equivalent, has the potential to be tailored to 
the local conditions that surround outbreaks of terrorist ideology. Because the Islamic 
world contains such a wide variety of subcultures, this would give any eradication 
strategy a greater ability to adapt to each subculture and region. The epidemic of terrorist 
ideology could be slowed down in this manner and eventually stopped, if the program 




Looking at terrorist ideology as an epidemic makes it possible to apply the models 
used by epidemiologists. SIR models are good descriptors of epidemics, and can be 
changed in order to increase complexity and show more interactions that exist within 
97 
 
populations in question. With notional rates, these models show the sorts of things to look 
at and where the target populations might be for any eventual eradication strategy. 
Just as eradication strategies apply to biological epidemics, they have correlates 
when it comes to ideational epidemics. In this sense, a mass-marketing campaign could 
be considered to be like a mass immunization program. Accordingly, a more targeted and 
surveillance-rich ring immunization strategy would be similar to a program that followed 
the social networks of known terrorists and tailored “immunization” ideas to the 
surrounding networks of people. Modeling and eradication of the social epidemic of 
terrorism may be a far-reaching goal, but it provides a fresh paradigm for the study of 








People who wish to solve problems associated with the spread of terrorist 
ideology have taken many different approaches to their solutions. Within Western 
culture, it is a common assumption that the struggle against terrorists is a war similar to 
wars that have been fought against other ideologies. This assumption creates a problem, 
however, because the cultural barriers between radical Islamists and Westerners are great. 
Rather than modeling problems associated with the War on Terror in a way that 
incorporates Western expectations about the nature of war and conflict, it would make 
more sense to see the spread of extremist Islamic ideology as an epidemic of ideas. 
With this core idea in mind, this thesis has explored the methodologies associated 
with epidemiology. Particularly, it has focused on the mathematical models used by 
epidemiologists to model the spread of epidemics. Using different variants of the basic 
deterministic mathematical model in epidemiology, the SIR model, it has shown the way 
that different factors that influence the spread of epidemics change the way that an 
epidemic can be modeled. From short-term and simple in the SIR epidemic model to 
complex partitioned models that show interactions between age groups or influence 
categories, this paper looks through the types of models one can develop to understand 
the dynamics of an epidemic. Additionally, epidemic eradication strategies are considered 
and described, along with when and where they would work best. 
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From there the thesis continues on to apply the models developed to the specific 
problem of the epidemic of terrorist ideology. Each type of model from the simple to the 
complex is considered, and applied with notional initial rates. From there, it discusses the 
application of different eradication strategies to the epidemic of terrorist ideology. While 
a mass-marketing strategy might be the most obvious approach, a targeted ring strategy 
with adaptability to local subcultures might have a greater effect. While no strategy will 
immediately end the spread of terrorist ideology, either of these could eventually end the 
epidemic. 
This is a first look at how to approach the question of terrorism and the fight 
against it from another angle. Since almost all of the problem-solving models that have 
been developed to fight terrorism incorporate ideas about the struggle being a war of 
sorts, this is a new set of assumptions to use to base models on. Instead of talking about 
target value, risk assessment, and resource allocation, it might be better to think about 
eradication strategies, control measures, and threshold numbers. Since the current 
paradigms that back studies of counterterrorism seem to be breaking down, this new 








There are an abundance of possible future directions for research into the 
application of epidemiology to the study of terrorism. Even the models presented within 
this paper need to be populated with demographic data. The rates of infection, recovery, 
contact rates, and sufficient exposure would need to be collected from intelligence or 
surveys done in the region of interest by social scientists. Demographic data about the 
regions of interest and data about the sociopolitical structure of these regions should be 
studied and applied where necessary. An abundance of data exists; it would take looking 
into which studies are applicable and how the studies could be quantified into meaningful 
numbers for epidemiological models. 
 
5.2.2 Other epidemiological models 
 
SIR models are not the extent of models of epidemics that exist within the realm 
of epidemiology. Indeed, this overview barely scratches the surface of the models 
available. It is intended to be an example of how the tools of epidemiologists could be 
used to study and understand terrorism. Another type of epidemiological models that 
would be of interest are geographical models that show the spread of an infection 
throughout a region with contour plots for each time period. These have been used with 
biological epidemics to track the source of an infection, and might have a parallel use for 
ideational epidemics. Used over a “landscape” of social networks, this might clarify the 




Even the compartmentalized model could be developed further, so that instead of 
a basic SIR model, some vertical transmission of immunity (the category M) is 
incorporated into the model. This would model the influence that parents would have 
over their offspring. Additionally, a latent period, where an individual may be infected 
but is not yet infectious (the category E) could shed light on the model. 
 
5.2.3 Using other applications of epidemiology 
 
The applications of epidemiology that have been developed by marketers should 
be studied. “Viral marketing” might well be incorporated in the eventual eradication 
strategy applied to the spread of extremist Islamist ideology. Marketers have spent more 
time studying ideational epidemics than any other group of people, and thus their 
methods and findings about epidemics of ideas are the best source of data and strategies 
for someone who would seek to apply the idea to another discipline. While the study of 
counterterrorism must be kept distinct from trend research, there are some valid 
correspondences between these disciplines as well.  
 
5.2.4 Using SIR models for optimization 
 
Some applications of SIR models of biological epidemics include using the model 
as a definition of the feasible region within which to optimize some function of the 
variables in the system. For instance, one paper optimizes resource allocation by showing 
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the effects that several control measures would have on a SIR model and using a function 
of the infected population as the objective value function. One seeks to minimize the 
numbers of infected within the model by applying the control measures that are 
constrained by budgetary requirements. (Zaric and Brandeau, 2002) Similarly, one could 
model different eradication strategies and their perceived effects, and optimize using the 
SIR model to show what the effects might be. The SIR model is a different conception of 
the shape of terrorism within a region, and may have some applicability as a background 
for other often-used methods of problem-solving. The idea that terrorism could be 
conceived of as an epidemic of ideas crosses disciplinary boundaries and will require 
some synthesis of disciplines and approaches in order to be well applied, but it carries 




Reassessing our assumptions about terrorism and how to fight it has the potential 
to change all of the approaches to fighting terrorists. Since the United States is now 
engaged in a War on Terror, this is a good avenue to explore. It is evident that, while 
some of the strategies of warfare that have been used to fight the war on terrorism are 
effective, many are not, and the struggle continues to become increasingly more bogged 
down. The military is notorious for “fighting the last war,” because that is the war that we 
understand, but paradigms from the Cold War break down when applied to the struggle 




and model that disease as we would an epidemic, it might well cast light on the problems 
with the current state of affairs and highlight better courses of action for the future. A 




Appendix: Mathematica 5.2 Code for SIR plots 
 






    sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s'[t] -beta*i[t]*s[t],i'[t] beta*i[t]*s[t]-gamma*i[t], s[0] 1-
*k,i[0] 0.05*k},{s,i},{t,0,50}]]; 0.05    
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s[t],i[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,50},DisplayFunction→Identity]]
; 
    k++]; 
For[k=20,k<40, 
    sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s'[t] -beta*i[t]*s[t],i'[t] beta*i[t]*s[t]-gamma*i[t], s[0] 0.51+(k-
0.025,i[0] 0.01},{s,i},{t,0,50}]]; 20)*    
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s[t],i[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,50},DisplayFunction→Identity]]
; 
    k++]; 
Show[plots,AspectRatio→1,PlotRange→{{0,1},{0,1}},DisplayFunction→$DisplayFunction] 
Clear[solution] 







 Graphics  
 (*This plots the endemic phase plane*) 





    sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s'[t] -beta*i[t]*s[t]+mu-mu*s[t],i'[t] beta*i[t]*s[t]-gamma*i[t]-
[t], s[0] 1-0.05*k,i[0] 0.05*k},{s,i},{t,0,200}]]; mu*i    
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s[t],i[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,200},DisplayFunction→Identity]
]; 
    k++]; 
For[k=20,k<40, 
    sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s'[t] -beta*i[t]*s[t]+mu-mu*s[t],i'[t] beta*i[t]*s[t]-gamma*i[t]-
[t], s[0] 0.51+(k-20)*0.025,i[0] 0.01},{s,i},{t,0,100}]]; mu*i    
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s[t],i[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,100},DisplayFunction→Identity]
]; 













 Graphics  
 (*This plots s[t], i[t] and r[t] over time for the epidemic SIR model*) 
beta=2.25; gamma=1.5; 
NDSolve[{s'[t] -beta*i[t]*s[t], i'[t] beta*i[t]*s[t]-gamma*i[t], s[0] .99, i[0] .01}, {s,i}, 
{t,0,25}] 
Plot[Evaluate[{s[t], i[t], 1-(s[t]+ i[t])}/.%],{t,0,25}, PlotRange→{{0,25},{0,1}}] 
 {{s→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,25.}},<>],i→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,25.}},<>]}} 







 Graphics  
 (*This plots s[t], i[t] and r[t] over time for the endemic SIR model*) 
beta=21/20; gamma=1/3; mu = 1/60; 
NDSolve[{s'[t] -beta*i[t]*s[t]+mu-mu*s[t], i'[t] beta*i[t]*s[t]-gamma*i[t]-mu*i[t], s[0] .99, 
i[0] .01}, {s,i}, {t,0,120}] 











 Graphics  
 (*This plots the two age group SIR model phase plane: s1[t]+s2[t] vs. i1[t]+i2[t]*) 
 






    sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s1'[t] (c1+d1)*P1-(beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t]-
(c1+d1)*s1[t],s2'[t] c1*s1[t]-(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-
(c2+d2)*s2[t],i1'[t] (beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t]-
(gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P1-
*P1*k,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2*k,i1[0] 0.05*P1*k,i2[0] 0.05*P2*k},{s1,s2,i1,i2},{t,0,200}]]; 0.05    
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s1[t]+s2[t],i1[t]+i2[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,200},DisplayFunc
tion→Identity]]; 
    k++]; 
Show[plots,AspectRatio→1,PlotRange→{{0,1},{0,1}},DisplayFunction→$DisplayFunction] 
Clear[sols] 







 Graphics  
 (*This plots the two age group SIR model phase plane: s1[t] vs. i1[t]*) 
 











(gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P1-
*P1*k,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2*k,i1[0] 0.05*P1*k,i2[0] 0.05*P2*k},{s1,s2,i1,i2},{t,0,200}]]; 0.05    
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s1[t],i1[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,200},DisplayFunction→Identit
y]]; 
    k++]; 
Show[plots,AspectRatio→1,PlotRange→{{0,P1},{0,P1}},DisplayFunction→$DisplayFunction] 
Clear[sols] 








 Graphics  
 (*This plots the two age group SIR model phase plane: s2[t] vs. i2[t]*) 






    sols=Append[sols,NDSolve[{s1'[t] (c1+d1)*P1-(beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t]-
(c1+d1)*s1[t],s2'[t] c1*s1[t]-(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-
(c2+d2)*s2[t],i1'[t] (beta11*i1[t]+beta12*i2[t])*s1[t]-
(gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P1-
*P1*k,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2*k,i1[0] 0.05*P1*k,i2[0] 0.05*P2*k},{s1,s2,i1,i2},{t,0,200}]]; 0.05    
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s2[t],i2[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,200},DisplayFunction→Identit
y]]; 












 Graphics  
 (*This plots s[t], i[t] and r[t] over time for the age category SIR model*) 
 




(gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P1-












 Graphics  
 (*This plots s1[t], i1[t] and r1[t] over time for the age category SIR model*) 
 




(gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P1-
0.05*P1,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2,i1[0] 0.05*P1,i2[0] 0.05*P2}, {s1,s2,i1,i2}, {t,0,150}] 













 Graphics  
 (*This plots s2[t], i2[t] and r2[t] over time for the age category SIR model*) 
 




(gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P1-
0.05*P1,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2,i1[0] 0.05*P1,i2[0] 0.05*P2}, {s1,s2,i1,i2}, {t,0,150}] 
Plot[Evaluate[{s2[t],i2[t], P2-(s2[t]+i2[t])}/.%],{t,0,60}, PlotRange→{{0,60},{0,P2}}]  
{{s1→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],s2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i1→InterpolatingFu
nction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>]}} 
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(gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P1-
*P1*k,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2*k,i1[0] 0.05*P1*k,i2[0] 0.05*P2*k},{s1,s2,i1,i2},{t,0,200}]]; 0.05    
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s1[t]+s2[t],i1[t]+i2[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,200},DisplayFunc
tion→Identity]]; 












 Graphics  
 (*This plots s[t], i[t] and r[t] over time for the influence category SIR model with immunization*) 
 
beta11=.75;beta12=100;beta21=0.2;beta22=25;alpha11=.5;alpha12=75;alpha21=.1;alpha22=20; 




(gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P1-












 Graphics  
 (*This plots the two influence groups SIR model phase plane with immunization: s2[t] vs. i2[t]*) 
 
beta11=.75;beta12=100;beta21=0.2;beta22=25;alpha11=.5;alpha12=75;alpha21=.1;alpha22=20; 









(gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P1-
*P1*k,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2*k,i1[0] 0.05*P1*k,i2[0] 0.05*P2*k},{s1,s2,i1,i2},{t,0,200}]]; 0.05    
plots=Append[plots,ParametricPlot[Evaluate[{s2[t],i2[t]}/.sols[[k]]],{t,0,200},DisplayFunction→Identit
y]]; 












 Graphics  








(gamma1+c1+d1)*i1[t],i2'[t] c1*i1[t]+(beta21*i1[t]+beta22*i2[t])*s2[t]-(gamma2+c2+d2)*i2[t], s1[0] P1-
0.05*P1,s2[0] P2-0.05*P2,i1[0] 0.05*P1,i2[0] 0.05*P2}, {s1,s2,i1,i2}, {t,0,150}] 
Plot[Evaluate[{s2[t],i2[t], P2-(s2[t]+i2[t])}/.%],{t,0,60}, PlotRange→{{0,60},{0,P2}}]  
{{s1→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],s2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i1→InterpolatingFu
nction[{{0.,150.}},<>],i2→InterpolatingFunction[{{0.,150.}},<>]}} 
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